Evolution of
Empathizing and Systemizing: Empathizing
as an aspect of social intelligence, systemizing as an evolutionarily later
consequence of economic specialization
Bruce G Charlton*, Patrick
Rosenkranz
School of Psychology, Newcastle University,
NE1 7RU, UK. Email: bruce.charlton@ncl.ac.uk (*Corresponding author)
https://thewinnower.com/papers/4249-evolution-of-empathizing-and-systemizing-empathizing-as-an-aspect-of-social-intelligence-systemizing-as-an-evolutionarily-later-consequence-of-economic-specialization
Abstract
We argue that a
theory of the evolution of Empathizing (E) and Systemizing (S) needs first to
clarify that these are personality traits, as distinct from cognitive abilities.
The theory should explain both the observed reciprocity of, and the sexual
difference between, E and S in a context of the historical emergence of these
traits and their balance in relation to local selection pressures. We suggest
that the baseline state is that (since humans are social animals) ancestral
human hunter gatherers are assumed to be relatively High Empathizers, lower in
Systemizing: thus more interested in people than in things. Changes related to
the development of agriculture and technology meant that it became economically
useful for some men to become more interested in ‘things’ than in people, as a
motivation for them to learn and practice skills that were vital to personal
and (secondarily) social survival, reproduction and expansion. This selection
pressure applied most strongly to men since in the sexual division of labour it
was typically men’s role to perform such tasks. We further hypothesize that
High Systemizing men were rewarded for their socially vital work by increased
resources and high status. Because marriages were arranged in traditional
societies mainly by parental choice (and the role of parental choice was
probably increased by agriculture), it is presumed that the most valued women,
that is young and healthy women thereby having high reproductive potential,
were differentially allocated to be wives of economically successful High
Systemizers. Such unions of economically successful High Systemizing men with
the most reproductively valuable women would be expected to lead to
greater-than-average reproductive success, thereby amplifying the population
representation of genes that cause high systematizing in the population. This
hypothesis makes several testable predictions.
Introduction:
What is it that needs to be explained?
The first purpose
of this paper is conceptual clarification. In other words, we first aim to
clarify what an evolutionary theory of Empathizing and Systemizing needs to
explain: we need to be clear what has evolved, before we can suggest why and
how it may have evolved.
Therefore we need
to define the nature of both Empathizing (E) and Systemizing (S), and to
emphasize that they are personality traits or ‘dispositions’ rather than
cognitive abilities (see the section below for further explanation of this
distinction). We consider E as the disposition to apply ‘theory of mind’ (or
social intelligence) reasoning to experience; while Systemizing is a
disposition to apply non-social, abstract and systematic reasoning to
experience.
Therefore, E and
S are distinctive modes of thinking – so that in an identical situation, an
Empathizer would use one mode of thinking, while a Systemizer would use another
– even if both had the same underlying cognitive abilities, their preferences
or dispositions would be different.
To put matters
simply, E and S describe a fundamental orientation towards either People or
Things. An orientation could be understood in terms of a spontaneous focus, or
a preference. The reason for an orientation may be sought in terms of motivational
systems of gratification and aversion: a concern with either people or things,
will tend to give a particular person more pleasure (or less pain) than its
opposite.
But the situation
is not symmetrical for Empathizing and Systemizing, because Man is a social
animal: thus a focus on people is to be expected, while a focus on things in
preference to people is unexpected, and invites specific explanation.
In evolutionary
terms, we therefore can take high E almost for granted, and the pressing need
is to explain how it was possible that a preference to deal with things rather
than people was able to arise, specifically in men more strongly than in women
(Baron-Cohen, 2003). This need comes from our presumption that a preference for
things over people would – on the face of it - be likely to cause a selective
dis-advantage in terms of social relationships.
In particular, we
would assume that (all else being equal) Systemizing would probably be a
disadvantage from the perspective of sexual selection in its major form of
female sexual choice – in a nutshell, it would seem probable that individual
young women would prefer to choose high-Empathizers as sexual partners, rather
than high-Systemizers. So, for high Systemizing to have evolved in at least some
human populations; we need to explain how this presumed selective disadvantage
may have been overcome: in particular how ancestral women of high reproductive
potential could on average have ended-up reproducing with men who were
relatively more interested in things than they were interested in people!
The second (and
main) purpose of this paper is to describe specific hypotheses as to how and
why E and S traits may have evolved in ancestral humans, what may have been
their pay-offs in terms of reproductive success under specific conditions, and
to clarify the reason for the reciprocity of these traits and the existence of
sex differences in E and S (Baron-Cohen, 2003).
In brief; we
regard Empathizing as the default human personality since, as the application
of social intelligence, it reflects the great importance of social
relationships to reproductive success. By contrast, we regard Systemizing as
having emerged later in evolutionary history (and only in some, not all, human
populations) as a result of novel selection pressures mainly due to changed
economic conditions - especially the development of more-complex humans
societies (such as those dependent on complex technologies or based on
agriculture and trade) with a variety of socially-essential, specialized
‘jobs’: especially for men.
These
evolutionary hypotheses are, at this point, necessarily speculative and
intended to serve as a guide for future empirical research and testing, rather
than providing definitive answers.
Empathizing and Systemizing
conceptualized as personality traits
Empathizing and
Systemizing are personality traits – and the distinction between personality
and cognitive ability, especially general intelligence or ‘g’, is something
that needs to be made clear (Dutton and Charlton, 2016).
Intelligence and
Personality are the two main ways that psychologists have developed for
describing ‘individual differences’ between people and populations. The two
types of differences can approximately be summarized as follows: intelligence
is ability, while personality is character (or ‘disposition’); intelligence is
general – with the level of intelligence affecting many specific abilities,
while personality can be understood as a pattern of motivations, preferences,
satisfactions etc.
In terms of an
analogy with computers – intelligence is something like the processing speed,
while personality is more analogous to the types of software installed. Or (and
recognizing that a computer analogy for brain functioning is both selective and
biased), intelligence is about the efficiency of the brain, while personality
is about what that particular brain is designed to do. Or, intelligence is
about how well the brain works; while personality describes the circuitry, the
hard-wiring – what kind of brain it is.
A further
practical difference is that intelligence is measured by tests – for example IQ
tests of various types; while personality is typically evaluated by human
beings – either self-rated using self-describing personality scales, or else
rated by other people.
But an important
similarity is that both IQ and personality are (nearly always) comparative
measurements. A person ‘high’ in intelligence, or high on a personality trait
such as Empathizing, is high relative to other people. The terms ‘High’ and
‘Low’, when used both in intelligence and personality, therefore does not
describe an objective measurement of a personal attribute in the way that (for
example) high or low blood pressure or blood sugar measurements would. (This is
why the psychological field is described as individual differences.)
Empathizing and
Systemizing are properly conceptualized as personality traits, aspects of
character, dispositions or preferences to behave in certain ways; and therefore
not as cognitive abilities. E-S variations are thus not-necessarily correlated
with cognitive abilities – and indeed in some studies there is no significant
measurable correlation between E or S cognitive abilities. This is as expected,
since personality studies were developed (especially by HJ Eysenck) to describe
and compare individuals in a way that was not captured by IQ differences
(Dutton & Charlton, 2016). For example, there is neither a strong nor
consistent association between the ‘reading the mind in the eyes’ test (a test
of a cognitive ability), and scores on a self-evaluation Empathizing scale (a
measure of disposition or personality): so that an individual may score highly
at reading the mind in the eyes but score low on an Empathizing scale, or vice
versa (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004; Voracek &
Dressler, 2006).
So, a disposition
is a personality trait: understandable as a sustained tendency, an individual’s
characteristic of habitually deploying a mode of cognition. A disposition can
also be seen as an individual’s preference for using an ability. (In the sense
that preferences can only select between a certain set of abilities; one cannot
characteristically be disposed to act in any way that one is incapable of
acting.) And preference to behave in certain ways is (presumably) based on a
motivation, and motivation is associated with a psychological reward (or
gratification) from doing something – or else a psychological punishment (or
aversive consequence) of not doing something.
Ultimately,
therefore, a disposition such as Empathizing reflects that certain types of
behaviour lead to increased gratification (increased pleasure or diminution of
suffering) – and behaviour that leads to increased gratification is preferred.
Individuals differ in the types of behaviour that lead to gratification, and in
the degree of gratification associated with a specific type of behaviour – so
ultimately personality differences are underpinned by differences in what
individuals find gratifying.
In sum, individual
and group variations in Systemizing and Empathizing can be understood as
variations in the type of behaviour that (on average) lead to gratification.
Put simply: Empathizers gain enhanced gratification from Empathizing behaviour,
while Systemizers gain enhanced gratification from Systemizing behaviour. For
example, a typical High-Systemizer may have the ability to understand and
empathize with other people, but he prefers to spend most of his time doing
crosswords; while a typical High-Empathizer may be able to do crosswords to a
high standard, but she would prefer to converse with a group of friends.
Naturally, the
disposition to be Empathizing or Systemizing requires that there be the
cognitive ability to do these behaviours; to empathize requires the ability to
empathize and to systemize requires that different ability. And at extremes of
disposition there may be a deficit in such abilities, so that the extreme
Empathizer may be defective in systemizing ability and the extreme Systemizer
may be defective in theory of mind ability.
However,
deficiencies in either E or S ability are not necessary to the finding of
variations in E-S, and it seems that there may be a wide range of E-S
dispositions even when both abilities are fully intact. Therefore, these
abilities must first have evolved in order that a disposition to find them
rewarding and have a preference to use them may secondarily have evolved.
Evolution of the
Social Brain
The social brain
hypothesis sees social selection pressures as the driving force behind human
brain growth: higher cortical functions have evolved to deal with the adaptive
problems of complex group living (Adolphs, 1999, 2009; Dunbar, 1995, 1998;
Humphrey, 1976). The relative neocortex growth in humans and other primates is
due to the demands on executive brain function required by living in complex
social groups. Evidence in favour of this hypothesis shows that as group size
increases across primate species, neo-cortex size also grows (Dunbar, 1995,
1998). The set of cognitive adaptations that enable successful group living,
such as the abilities to perceive, recall and process information about others
and act according to this information, is often termed social intelligence
(Dunbar, 1998), Machiavellian intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988) or social
cognition (Brothers, 1990).
Group living
poses a number of adaptive problems for the individual: attracting and
maintaining a mate, monitoring and manipulating social interactions, outwitting
rivals and forming alliances, inferring dispositions, motivations and
intentions of others, etc. Selection apparently favoured those individuals who
were the most successful at solving these adaptive problems of group living. In
order successfully to survive and reproduce within a social setting, an
individual requires the cognitive ability to react adaptively to social
challenges and to affect others positively (Byrne & Whiten, 1988) .
Amongst the
cognitive abilities enabling complex social interaction are face perception,
emotional processing, theory of mind (TOM), self-reference and working memory
(Grady & Keightley, 2002). These abilities are mediated by the interplay of
activity of networks of interdependent brain regions which support the
behaviours necessary for social interaction (Grady & Keightley, 2002).
Amongst the neural architecture that contributes to social intelligence are the
amygdala, ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the right somatosensory related
cortex (Adolphs, 1999; Grady & Keightley, 2002).
An individual
potentially benefits in terms of reproductive success by being able to predict
the behaviour of others within the group, maintain beneficial social
relationships and even manipulate social situations to advantage (Byrne &
Whiten, 1988; Humphrey, 1976). A lack of the faculties required to function
adaptively within the group can have negative reproductive consequences for the
individual. The inability positively to affect others, at least to a degree,
and adaptively to interact within a group can lead to negative emotional
effects for the individual, social ostracism and ultimately, reproductive death
(i.e. failure to raise any viable offspring). This can most clearly be seen in
the devastating effects of lesions and or disorders to the social functioning
of the individual (Ylvisaker, Feeney, & Szekeres, 1998). For instance,
individuals with the autistic spectrum disorder have abnormal face perception
(Klin et al., 1999) as well as strong deficits in the theory of mind mechanism
(Grady & Keightley, 2002). Autistic individuals have difficulties in
adaptive social behaviour, avoid normal social contact and are generally
indifferent to social encounters (Baron-Cohen, 1997).
At the core of
social intelligence lies the ability to “mind read” or theory of mind: this is
the ability to infer the contents (beliefs, desires, intentions) of the mind of
other individuals, predicting behaviour based on these inferences and
empathizing with others states of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1999, 2000, 2006b;
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Dennett, 1971; Premack & Woodruff,
1978). Mindreading is often seen as a predominantly cognitive ability, however
emotions play a key role in inferring other agent’s content of mind and
reacting adaptively.
Emotions and the
somatic marker mechanism
Empathizing has
evolved to represent the affective states of others and to react with an
appropriate emotion. The importance of emotions in adaptive social behaviour is
extensive; and they are pivotal in successfully modelling social behaviour.
Relevant here is the somatic marker mechanism suggested by Antonio Damasio
(Damasio, 1994, 1996, 1999) and further elaborated by Charlton (Charlton, 2000,
2003; Charlton & McClelland, 1999).
Damasio (1994,
1995, 1999) makes a distinction between emotions and feelings: Emotions are
changes in body state (and non-conscious brain state to a secondary extent)
primed by either external or internal stimuli. Feelings are the conscious
awareness of these changes in body state (Damasio, 1994, 1995). Primary
emotions are those that are innate and triggered automatically in certain
situations (Charlton, 2000, 2003; Damasio, 1995). For instance, a “fear” response can be
triggered in the presence of a snake. The somatic response in this case would
be an increase in heart rate, higher frequency of breathing, dilated pupils
etc. This pattern of somatic changes constitutes the primary emotion of fear
that can modify and initiate behaviour, such as a flight or fight response.
These emotional changes in body states can be observed in most mammals;
however, it is only some primates (the great apes probably, plus some monkeys;
and perhaps a few other relatively large-brained social mammals such as
dolphins, orcas and elephants) and of course humans that can be aware of
emotions – that is, experience feelings (Charlton, 2000).
Secondary
emotions are those emotions triggered by internal events such as remembering an
encounter with a snake or planning a route to avoid a snake. Secondary emotions
are induced by cognitive representations, i.e. internal events that have
previously been associated with a primary emotion. These secondary emotional
representations are dispositional in that they include evaluative information
about the object/event priming the emotion in the first place. Thus, remembering
an encounter with a snake can invoke the same changes in body state as the
initial encounter. Secondary emotions can therefore be seen as being acquired
through experience, and are built upon the foundations of primary emotions
(Damasio, 1995). Secondary emotions therefore occur in response to cognitive
modelling or cognitive simulations - such as memories or plans (Charlton,
2000).
Feeling an
emotion involves secondary emotions, because feeling is the conscious awareness
of a pattern of changes in body state in relation to the representation that
primed these changes. Thus, representations are juxtaposed with relevant
somatic states, i.e. emotions, to the extent that these representations are
associated or marked with a particular emotion. This juxtaposition of
representation and emotion is what constitutes the somatic marker mechanism
(Charlton, 2000; Damasio, 1994).
According to
Damasio (Damasio, 1994, 1996), the somatic marker mechanism is fundamental to
distinctively human reasoning and decision making, especially within the social
and personal realm. The neurobiological site which is critical for the somatic
marker mechanism to function is the prefrontal cortex, more specifically the
ventro-medial sector (Damasio, 1996). Individuals with damage to this section
of the cortex have defective feelings, and face considerable difficulties
making appropriate social decisions (especially in relation to context and
planning), while still retaining normal intelligence and most intellectual
capacities including the ability to experience primary emotions (Damasio,
1996).
Ultimately, a
good decision for any organism is one that is advantageous for the reproductive
success and survival of the organism, as well as the quality of survival
(Damasio, 1994). Somatic markers assist and guide the decision making process
by modelling outcomes of decisions through changes in somatic state. A possible
bad outcome of a decision can manifest itself as an immediate negative feeling
such as fears, misery or disgust. The representation of the negative outcome of
a given response option is marked with the unpleasant feeling, allowing the
organism to reject a possible decision from the outset. Thus, in Damasio’s
words “somatic markers are special instances of feelings, generated from
secondary emotions. Those emotions and feelings have been connected, by
learning, to predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios.” (Damasio, 1994).
The somatic marker mechanism functions as both a warning and incentive system
for possible negative and positive outcomes.
When somatic
markers operate consciously, they can assist in the modelling and planning of
behaviour towards other organisms. By thinking about previous social encounters
and being aware of the emotional /somatic responses that are evoked through
these deliberations, dispositions and intentions of others can be inferred
(Charlton, 2000; Damasio, 1994).This means that somatic markers are pivotal in
internally modelling social behaviour.
Representations
of other people are linked in working memory with an appropriate feeling, thus
associating own emotional reactions with the representation of others. For
instance, the perception of a rival male can invoke the emotional reaction of
fear. The perceptual representation of this individual is then marked with the
somatic state of fear. At a later point in time, thinking about this
individual, i.e. drawing upon the representation from long term memory can
similarly produce the same emotional reaction. Inferences about the disposition
of the other individual can be modelled upon the subject’s own emotional
reaction to the encounter (Charlton, 2000). In sum, ‘theory of mind’ is
ultimately derived from awareness of the subject’s emotional response to
another person.
The somatic
marker mechanism can be seen as being the underlying neurobiological mechanism
of the theory of mind mechanism and the empathizing system. Where Baron-Cohen
(2005) describes the development and function of these two systems, Damasio’s
somatic marker explain the underlying neurobiological mechanism by which both
dispositions and inferences about another organisms’ mental as well as
affective states can be made.
Because human
intelligence and consciousness have fundamentally evolved to deal with the
social world, the spontaneous and immediate experience of the environment is
infused by social information. Humans are primed to interpret ambiguous
situation (like the fluttering of leaves) as being caused by agency (Barrett,
2000; Guthrie, 1995) and to reading social meaning into natural events (Bering,
2002). This tendency to anthropomorphise the significant environment and to
imbue it with social agency may underlie the evolution of religious beliefs
(Charlton, 2002a, 2002b; Guthrie, 1995; Rosenkranz & Charlton, 2013).
Empathizing
evolved to focus on people, Systemizing evolved to focus on things
Empathizing is
based upon the above-described ‘theory of mind’ ability. Theory of mind refers
to the ability, found in some social animals, to infer metal contents such as
dispositions, motivations and intentions in another con-specific.
We conceptualize
Empathizing as the disposition to apply ‘theory of mind’ cognitive ability –
this can be applied to the social situations for which the ability (presumably)
evolved, and also to understanding the world in general (and not just the
social world). In other words, Empathizing is the spontaneous tendency of
humans to focus on people, and also to regard ‘things’ as if they were people
(‘anthropmorphism’).
Since humans are
social animals, and in line with evolutionary concepts such as the Social Brain
and ‘Machiavellian Intelligence’, we regard social intelligence as probably
deriving from primate ancestry, and therefore closer to the ancient, natural
and spontaneous form of human interest and motivation than is an interest in
non-human-things. We therefore regard the highly Empathizing personality type
as underpinned by an evolutionarily more-ancient personality type than is
Systemizing.
In other words,
Empathizing is more fundamental to humans than Systemizing, and is intrinsic to
the species: Empathizing came before Systemizing. Further, it is possible that
a preference for Systemizing did not evolve in all populations, and may be weak
or absent in some human groups still extant. But in ancestral hunter gatherer
situations – perhaps including pre-modern hominid ancestors – we would assume
that all reproductively successful humans were not just able to infer theory of
mind, but disposed to focus on other humans and their mental contents: almost
everybody in these circumstances was probably a high Empathizer and so it seems
likely that the Systemizing trait was low, and that there may have been few or
zero high Systemizers.
Empathizing - in
its evolutionary origins - is therefore personal in its application, being
specifically directed towards actual human relationships. To have an
Empathizing disposition is to feel rewarded by attention to social matters, and
to use this cognitive style (evolved to deal with humans) as a general model of
understanding. Therefore be a high Empathizer is to see the world through
social spectacles (Charlton, 2000): to have a tendency to focus attention on
social relationships and to understand the world as analogous to social
relationships.
Empathizing seems
to be the natural and spontaneous way for humans to deal-with phenomena they
regard as important: this is seen in the tendency to anthropomorphise large and
important animals, significant places and landscape features, treasured
possessions and so on; and to treat human groups (or modern institutions) as if
they were unified, conscious and intentional organisms.
Re-defining
Systemizing as a preference for focusing on linear sequences of things
Systemizing is
(in its extreme) the disposition to attend to non-human matters – to things
rather than people; underpinned by the tendency to find non-social interactions
more rewarding, hence more motivating, than social matters.
The usual
definition of the trait of Systemizing relates to a preference to analyse the
world in terms of the rules which govern systems: such that the Systemizer is a
person who sees the world as composed of systems, and is interested in
categorization and understanding the rules, patterns or principles that
underlie these systems (Baron-Cohen, 2010; Baron-Cohen, Ashwin, Ashwin,
Tavassoli, & Chakrabarti, 2009). However, while this is clearly an accurate
description of the interests of a high Systemizing personality who also has
high general intelligence, we suggest that this is a potentially misleading
description of the Systemizing trait since it refers to the understanding of
complex systems; that is systems of processes that are governed by rules.
Yet it seems
plausible that an interest in the abstract understanding of the processes of
complex systems is underpinned (and evolutionarily preceded) by the simpler
abstract task of learning linear sequences. So in terms of a personality trait,
the interest in complex systems which is measured by Systemizing questionnaires
may be considered a more advanced type of an elementary interest in simpler
‘strings’ of facts, names, numbers, tasks or procedures.
To create
categorizations, to infer a pattern, and to extract the rules from a system are
higher-level cognitive abilities; possible only to those of relatively high
general intelligence (that is, high IQ). Abstraction of rules is, indeed, one
of the main attributes of ‘g’ which is measured in standard IQ tests: for
example in supplying the next member of a number series, or establishing group
membership, or performing a visuo-spatial task like Raven’s matrices (Deary,
2001; Gottfredson, 2005; Jensen, 1998). Those of low general intelligence are
poor at these tasks (which is why they are used to measure IQ), and this
implies that a focus on understanding the rules of systems is probably only a
practical definition of Systemizing among those of higher intelligence; because
people with a low IQ would not cognitively be able to infer and understand
rules, even if their disposition was high-S.
Therefore, while
inferring categories, patterns and rules certainly count as Systemizing
behaviour, we would favour a more basic and less cognitively-advanced
definition of systemizing: that the Systemizing trait is a disposition to be
interested by things rather than people which is seen at its most basic in
trying to learn linear sequences of abstract facts or actions.
The two main
aspects of Systemizing, we suggest, relate to the nature of content which is
not-social i.e. abstract; and to the content being understood in terms of
linear sequences of facts. Therefore Systemizing relates to:
1. Abstract
phenomena (things not people)
2. Of a specific
identity (these particular things)
3. In a specific
‘organization’ (in this order, or categorized thus)
A modern example
of the Systemizing preference, would be the kind of crazes and ‘obsessions’
which are characteristic of people on the autism spectrum or with Asperger’s
syndrome: learning lists of names and numbers from the telephone directory, or
certain types of dates, or pictures make by highly-literal copying, or learning
all the facts on a non-social themes such as automobile performance or the
performance of a sports team, or literal recollection of sequences from
favourite TV shows or passages from books, or hobbies involving collecting and
arranging – such as stamps, cards or train-spotting.
These and other
pastimes such as crossword or other puzzles, or some types of computer games,
are often about assembling sequences of correct facts or procedures (united by
theme or category) in a correct and specific order or pattern – yet these facts
or procedures may not have any rule-based ‘systemic’ structure. Typically, one
cannot learn these kinds of activity by learning and applying rules; rather, the
activity consists in performing exact sequences of correct responses on
specific material.
Interestingly, an
explanation of Systemizing in terms of the disposition to focus upon ‘close-up’
consideration of abstract linear sequences, bears striking similarities with
the concept of left cerebral hemisphere dominance as described in Iain
McGilchrist’s The master and his emissary concerning autistic traits and
‘attention to detail’ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2011; McGilchrist, 2009); although
at the same time McGilchrist’s evidence and argument renders implausible any
direct equation of left hemisphere with male, right with female. The argument
is complex and we flag it here as a matter deserving further and detailed
consideration.
Systemizing and
psychological neoteny
Indeed, this kind
of behaviour focused on linear sequence of abstract knowledge is characteristic
of children; for instance when they insist on a fairy story being told with
exactly the same words and details. Many pre-adolescent boys, in particular,
have periodic ‘crazes’ on various subjects (aircraft, trains, a type of book, a
type of construction model, a particular sport) about which theme they
voraciously learn everything they can manage.
These
pre-adolescent boy’s crazes are typically not focused on people nor on social
relations, nor are they focused on rule-based understanding; rather they are
fact-based, convergent activities involving listing, collecting, categorizing,
memorizing – based on learning sequences and patterns but not often complex or
dynamic ‘systems’.
This similarity
between pre-adolescent boys and high Systemizing men does not tell us why high
trait-Systemizing may have evolved – does not tell us how high Systemizing may
have improved differential reproductive success in our ancestors - but it may
suggest how high Systemizing evolved: by perpetuation of pre-adult behaviour
into sexual maturity. In other words high Systemizing trait in adults may be a
neotenous phenomenon.
(Neoteny is one
type of the more general class of ‘heterochrony’ in which evolutionary change
is brought about by alterations in the timing of developmental events; Horder,
2001.)
And this may
provide a clue to the proximate mechanism for the evolution of higher levels of
trait Systemizing. Natural selection usually works by quantitative modification
or amplification of some already-existing trait (as when a hand, or an arm,
evolves into a wing in a bat, or a bird; or when a neck, or a nose, become
lengthened in a giraffe, or an elephant). In humans, the evolution of the high
levels of Systemizing seen in modern people suggests that there was some
original trait which underwent evolutionary adaptive modification.
In other words;
if neoteny – or something similar – was the proximate mechanism via which natural
selection led to Systemizing, then we need to consider the trait which was
present in immature humans that may have provided the basis for the evolution
of adult Systemizing.
E-S reciprocity
and sex differentials as a consequence of selection pressure from
post-agricultural agricultural economic factors
The main
observations concerning E and S which an evolutionary hypothesis must explain
are, we suggest, firstly the reciprocity between Empathizing and Systemizing –
that when one is high the other is usually low; and secondly the characteristic
sex differential with S higher on average in men and E higher in women.
In a sense,
reciprocity is an intrinsic property of some personality traits: one cannot be
both highly extravert and highly introverted, cannot be both highly neurotic
and very stable. Similarly, one cannot be fascinated by social relationships
such as to spend most of one’s time and energy on that matter, and at the same
time fascinated by learning about abstract facts and figures and systems so as
to spent most of one’s time and energy on that matter as well.
Most strong
personality traits can, in principle, alternate in dominance over time and with
circumstance – but they cannot dominate simultaneously. So it is an intrinsic
property of E-S being descriptive of a personality trait that the
predisposition towards one extreme of the trait is itself a predisposition
away-from the other extreme.
However, in
addition the E-S personality traits have been persistently observed as different,
on average, between men and women. And most of the most highly empathic people
are women, while most high systemisers are men. This observation invites an
evolutionary explanation. We suggest that the ultimate (evolutionary) cause of
sex differentials in E-S lies in the sexual division of labour among humans;
men and women having different characteristic roles: women focused on child
care and food gathering and preparation, men focused on whatever other tasks
require doing: e.g. hunting, fighting, crafts (Lee & Daly, 1999; Lee &
DeVore, 1968; Ridley, 1997).
Specifically, we
regard Empathizing as a baseline state common to ancestral men and women, and
Systemizing as having been selected-for at a later stage of human evolution,
primarily among men due to the ancestral economic division of labour, and the
economic benefits of having some men who are high Systemizers. We assume that
there were significant material rewards for those men who were both able and
willing to perform Systemizing tasks, and that these extra resources would have
enhanced the survival of the offspring of successful Systemizers.
Post-agricultural
evolution of the Systemizing trait
To recapitulate,
the Empathizing trait refers to theory of mind abilities, which would be
expected to be more evolutionarily ancient than the Systemizing trait, since
they are found in non-human primates. Therefore a disposition towards
Empathizing (theory of mind) are hypothesized to be a feature of pre-human
primate and ancestral hunter-gatherer societies. We believe that Systemizing
came later in human evolutionary history, and was an ability and disposition
that (in a sense) displaced pre-existing Empathizing - on average and among
men.
By contrast,
while it may have been beneficial for men to be somewhat higher than women in
Systemizing in hunter gatherer conditions; it is hard to see any need for, or
evidence for, high levels of Systemizing trait in ancestral-type hunter
gatherer societies, and it is hard to imagine a plausible benefit for a personality
type which is characterized by the kind of high Systemizing which can be
observed in modern Europeans – for instance those of the Asperger syndrome
type. Ancestral hunter gatherers were (it is assumed) well-equipped by natural
selection to deal with most of the non-personal/ ‘thing’-related problems they
would encounter, since they had lived in the same type of environment for up to
hundreds of generations. The social brain perspective suggests that the most
cognitively-complex tasks our ancestors confronted were related to
understanding, predicting and manipulating human social interactions (Byrne
& Whiten, 1988). And for these problems, humans were prepared by their
theory of mind abilities, and the ‘Empathizing’ personality was motivated to apply
theory of mind abilities in relating to the world.
Furthermore,
ancestral hunter gatherers were generalists: apart from a sexual division of
labour, essentially all women were involved in gathering and child care, only
men were warriors and hunters. Any other activities needed to be fitted-around
these requirements, but because the usual group size was small (probably around
15-35 including both the young and the old) there was only a little scope for
specialization of function except in terms of sex and age (Charlton, 2000; Lee
& Daly, 1999).
Systemizing
abilities and interests therefore seems likely to be most beneficial in
post-agricultural, more complex, less ‘natural’ human societies. Indeed,
agricultural societies are usually characterized by some degree of economic
specialization - especially among men (Woodburn, 1982). This is necessary
because of the greater need for learned knowledge and technology – agriculture
is itself a specialist expert activity requiring not just invention but
significant preservation and inter-generational transmission of knowledge
(which is why it was not invented as a stable and continuing social form until
the past 10-15,000 years)
The evolution of
Systemizing can therefore be seen in the context of life history (Rushton,
1985). Woodley (2011) sees ancestral hunter gatherer societies as characterized
by a relatively fast life history – with high fertility, rapid maturation of
offspring and early maturity – and this leading to an un-specialized type of
human – with a narrow range or ‘manifold’ of abilities. This situation may be
associated with strong sexual selection – men investing on average little in
their offspring but competing for multiple promiscuous matings (with uncertain
paternity); presumably men would tend toward early maturity, high vigour and
physical prowess, but a short life and a mainly social intelligence (e.g. men
being charming rather than Systemizing).
By contrast, as
agriculture emerged, and population density increased; it is probable that life
history was slowed due to greater competition between humans (Woodley, 2011) In
such a situation, men especially would seek a niche in which they could excel,
and this would be associated with slower and later maturation – and a wider
range (or manifold) of abilities between individuals - which meant that some
people were better at one thing while other people were expert at different
things. The trend would be towards lower fertility but higher level of parental
investment per offspring – and the father contributing economic investment to
their offspring (about which they would need have had a high degree of
certainty of paternity for this behaviour to be adaptive; Wilson and Daly
(1992), Charlton and McClelland (1999).
How the advent of
agriculture and technological complexity may have favoured higher systemizing
trait in men
In ancestral
‘simple’ hunter gatherer societies there were probably a few tasks which
focused on dealing with ‘things’ and where a personality preference for such
tasks might be adaptive: problems such as navigating across a desert,
manufacturing a spear thrower or stone axe, or preparing poison for a bow and
arrow. Typically such jobs require (in pre-literate societies) learning and
precisely remembering an exact sequence of steps. But such tasks are far more
numerous, and more important, in agricultural societies where there is more
technology, and where farming and the preparation and storage of food must be
learned and repeated exactly year after year (Woodburn, 1982).
Such societies
also typically develop specialists in religious ritual (priests) and in various
crafts – and craft expertise in particular becomes absolutely essential to the
survival of societies (Ingold, 2000; Ridley, 1997). Yet such crafts must be
devised, remembered, and transmitted between generations. Our assumption is
that it was this kind of selection pressure in agricultural societies which led
to the evolution of high levels of Systemizing seen in some members of modern
populations.
Systemizing was
therefore a kind of expert disposition; indeed Systemizing was exactly the
trait that would enable expertise to develop; because expertise was (we infer)
mostly a matter of learning and memorizing accurately precise sequential facts
and procedures. Thus the development of expertise is only partly about ability
to perform a type of task – equally (or more) important is the personality
which is motivated to do such tasks.
In other words,
we suggest that before the development of agriculture, humans were originally
towards the Empathizing end of the trait and that sexual differentiation was
probably very limited; and that the characteristic observed modern pattern of
E-S is primarily a product of economic selection pressures after the
development of agriculture. We suggest, therefore, that the primary
evolutionary cause of the range and reciprocity of E-S and also the higher
average levels of S in men, was the sexual division of labour in a context of
agricultural economic systems.
Adding together
all these factors, our suggestion is that after the advent of agriculture, and
amplified as human societies became more complex, more differentiated by
specialization, and more technologically advanced; those men who were higher in
the Systemizing trait enjoyed greater economic success with benefits in terms
of wealth. This meant that high S men would have more resources to invest in
their children, enabling them to rear more children to adulthood.
This matter of
resources seems, indeed, to have been the major reproductive constraint in
pre-modern societies. Until the industrial revolution, fertility was high in
almost all social groups, but a high proportion of children died in childhood
(e.g. from starvation and infectious diseases) – indeed among the poorest
people, almost all children would be likely to die without reproducing. Those
parents whose children had the lowest child mortality were therefore those with
the highest reproductive success (Volk & Atkinson, 2013). The main factor
that enabled some families to rear above-replacement numbers of children was
wealth (Clark, 2007).
Therefore if
high-S men did indeed (as we suggest) offer a higher probability of economic
success, then under pre-modern conditions this would be highly likely to
translate into greater reproductive success.
Sexual selection
Personality
clearly affects sexual attractiveness, and may therefore be subject to sexual
selection. On the one hand, common sense, personal observation and theoretical
considerations suggest that, on average, women do not find the highly
Systemizing personality (with its preference for things rather than people) to
be (of itself) sexually attractive in men. So, in a society, where young women
chose their own mates and husbands, it seems hard to imagine that Systemizing
would be amplified by sexual selection – rather, it would seem that sexual
selection might tend to prevent an increase in systemizing trait among men.
On the other
hand, individual female sexual preferences are not necessarily an important
factor in determining sexual or marriage partners in the ancient and
traditional human societies. This is because parental choice of a woman’s
sexual and marriage partners was the almost universal norm among pre-modern
human societies, and indeed parental dominance of their daughters’ reproductive
decisions seems to have increased in frequency and strength with the transition
from hunter gatherers to agriculture (Apostolou, 2014).
So, most
historical human societies did not allow much scope for individual female choice
of sexual or marriage partners and young women were essentially allocated to
husbands – mainly by their parents (Wilson & Daly, 1992; Apostolou, 2014).
In such societies, sexual selection, works not between a potential husband and
wife, but primarily between a potential husband and his potential
parents-in-law. What was important was not so much a man being
sexually-attractive to a young women (as may be the case in modern societies),
but primarily an attractive prospective husband and father as judged by the
young women’s middle-aged parents. This opens up considerable scope for
positive sexual selection of high-Systemizing trait, if high-S is associated
with the kind of attributes which parents-in-law are likely to value – that is,
traits that seem like to increase the probability of rearing numerous
grandchildren to adulthood.
Individual sexual
choice seems, in particular, to be very limited in most stable agricultural
societies and there seems to have been an increase in parental control over
marriage between hunter gatherers and agriculturalists, if modern examples of
these societies are taken as a guide (Apostolou, 2014) – and it is our
assumption that it was precisely these stable agricultural societies in which
the Systemizing trait is likely to have arisen and been amplified in men.
A further factor
is that one of the most powerful factors affecting female sexual preference is
male status. Insofar as a high Systemizing trait leads to higher status in a
man, then it may be indirectly sexually attractive – unattractive in itself,
but associated with a higher status that is attractive (Buss, 1995; Symons,
1980).
If the
Systemizing trait is probably (on average) either neutral or unattractive to
individual young women, this suggests that when women are allowed to choose
freely, sexual selection probably works to reduce or eliminate the Systemizing
trait. This would imply that under modern conditions of independent female
choice of sexual and marriage partners, Systemizing would be under a negative selection
pressure; and that this aspect of male personality may well be experiencing a
‘selective sweep’ in which the representation of the trait in the gene pool
will currently be changing from one equilibrium towards another (Miller, 2010).
Another aspect is
that a highly Systemizing disposition would presumably (like all personality
traits) be substantially inherited by female children as well as male children
– even when there are sex differentials (Miller, 2000). So that high-S women
would become more common, as well as high-S men – simply as a by-product of the
economic selection pressure on men. Then, since Systemizing reflects a person’s
interests, and shared interest may be a factor in mate choice; it would be
expected that more highly Systemizing women would tend to regard highly
Systemizing men as relatively more attractive than would high-E women –
especially if the woman was expecting to spend a lot of time with her husband.
(This would be a form of assortative mating, whereby sexual partners are chosen
on the basis of similarity; Miller, 2009.)
Assuming that
high-S was rewarded by greater economic success and therefore the pay-off of
being able to raise more children to viable adulthood – this would result in a
population increasing in average Systemizing with each generation. And
assortative mating between high Systemizers could plausibly be a mechanism by
which ultra-high Systemizing might become a feature of populations – especially
in men (Baron-Cohen, 2006a). Therefore this may be a plausible mechanism for
the emergence of Asperger syndrome at a high frequency and severity – as a
by-product of generations of relatively high-S women choosing high-S men as
partners.
Predictions
The theory leads
to a number of testable predictions:
Systemizing may
be undergoing (in developed societies) on the one hand assortative mating which
amplifies the number of very high Systemizers (Baron-Cohen, 2006a). However, in
the opposite direction, the weakening of parental influence on mating decisions
and the greater operation of sexual selection in the form of individual female
sexual choice would probably generate a selective sweep that would be reducing
the average level of S generation-by-generation.
The male female
difference in E and S may have been quantitatively less in hunter gather
societies than in agricultural or modern societies – and this smaller
differential may be measurable in the modern social groups which have most
recently been living as hunter gatherers; and who therefore have not yet experienced
many generations of the selection effects of complex societies.
The theoretical
model also suggests possible methods of measuring Systemizing and Empathizing
by developing instruments that quantify people’s spontaneous preferences as
expressed in choices between focusing on either on people or else things.
References
Adolphs, R.
(1999). Social cognition and the human brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3:
469-79.
Adolphs, R.
(2009). The social brain: neural basis of social knowledge. Annual Review of
Psychology, 60: 693-716.
Apostolou, M.
(2014). Sexual selection under parental choice: the evolution of human mating
behaviour. London: Psychology Press.
Baron-Cohen,S.
(1997). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge, MA,
USA: MIT Press.
Baron-Cohen, S.
(1999). Evolution of a theory of mind ? In Corballis, M, & Lea, S (eds) The
descent of mind: psychological perspectives on hominid evolution. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp. 1-31.
Baron-Cohen, S.
(2000). Theory of mind and autism: A review. International Review of Research
in Mental Retardation, 23: 169-184.
Baron-Cohen, S.
(2003). The essential difference: men, women and the extreme male brain.
London: Allen Lane.
Baron-Cohen, S.
(2005). The empathizing system: a revision of the 1994 model of the mindreading
system. Family Studies and Human Development. NY, USA: Guilford Press. Nueva
York, pp 1-44.
Baron-Cohen,
S.(2006a). The hyper-systemizing, assortative mating theory of autism. Progress
in Neuro-Psychopharmacology & Biological Psychiatry. 30: 865-872.
Baron-Cohen, S.
(2006b). Mindreading: Evidence for both innate and acquired factors. Journal of
Anthropological Psychology, 17: 26-27.
Baron-Cohen, S.
(2010). Empathizing, systemizing, and the extreme male brain theory of autism.
Sex Differences in the Human Brain, Their Underpinnings and Implications. 186:
167-175.
Baron-Cohen, S.,
Ashwin. E., Ashwin, C., Tavassoli, T., & Chakrabarti, B. (2009). Talent in
autism: hyper-systemizing, hyper-attention to detail and sensory
hypersensitivity. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 364:
1377-1383.
Baron-Cohen, S.,
Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a "theory
of mind" ? Cognition, 21: 37-46.
Baron-Cohen, S.,
Lombardo, M.V. , Auyeung, B., Ashwin, E., Chakrabarti, B & Knickmeyer, R.
(2011). Why are autism spectrum conditions more prevalent in males? PLoS
Biology, 9: e1001081. doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.1001081.
Barrett, J.L.
(2000). Exploring the natural foundations of religion. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 4: 29-34.
Bering, J.M.
(2002). The existential theory of mind. Review of General Psychology, 6: 3-24.
Buss, D.M.
(1995). On the evolution of desire. Contemporary Psychology, 40: 711-711.
Byrne, R. &
Whiten, A. (1988). Machiavellian intelligence: social expertise and the
evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes and humans. Oxford: Clarendon.
Charlton, B.G.
(2000). Psychiatry and the human condition. Oxford: Radcliffe Medical Press.
Charlton, B.G.
(2002a). Alienation, neo-shamanism and recovered animism. Retrieved 09.04.2016
from www.hedweb.com/bgcharlton/animsim.html
Charlton, B.G.
(2002b). What is the meaning of life? Animism, generalised anthropomorphism and
social intelligence. Retrieved
09.04.2016 from www.hedweb.com/bgcharlton/meaning-of-life.html
Charlton, B.G.
(2003). Theory of mind delusions and bizarre delusions in an evolutionary
perspective: Psychiatry and the social brain. The Social Brain. London: John
Wiley & Sons, pp. 315-338
Charlton, B.G.
& McClelland, H.A. (1999). Theory of mind and the delusional disorders. The
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 187: 380-383.
Damasio, A.R.
(1994). Descartes' error: emotion, reason, and the human brain. NY, USA: Quill.
Damasio, A.R.
(1995). Toward a neurobiology of emotion and feeling: Operational concepts and
hypotheses. The Neuroscientist, 1: 19-25.
Damasio, A.R.
(1996). The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the
prefrontal cortex. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences, 351: 1413-1420.
Damasio, A.R.
(1999). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of
consciousness. London: Harcourt.
Deary, I.J.
(2001). Intelligence: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Dennett, D.C.
(1971). Intentional systems. The Journal of Philosophy 68: 87-106.
Dunbar, R.I.M.
(1995). Neocortex size and group size in primates: a test of the hypothesis.
Journal of Human Evolution 28: 287-296.
Dunbar, R.I.M.
(1998). The social brain hypothesis. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News,
and Reviews, 6: 178-190.
Dutton, E. &
Charlton, B.G. (2016). The genius famine. Buckingham, UK: University of
Buckingham Press.
Gottfredson, L.S.
(2005). Implications of cognitive differences for schooling within diverse
societies. In C. L. Frisby & C. R. Reynolds (Eds.), Comprehensive handbook
of multiculturalschool psychology. New York: Wiley, pp. 517-554
Grady, C.L.&
Keightley, M.L. (2002). Studies of altered social cognition in neuropsychiatric
disorders using functional neuroimaging. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 47:
327-36.
Guthrie, S.
(1995). Faces in the clouds: A new theory of religion. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Horder, T.
(2001). Heterochrony eLS: London: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accessed 09.04.
2016.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470015902.a0001778.pub3/full
Humphrey, N.K.
(1976). The social function of intellect. In: Growing points in ethology edited
P.P.G. Bateson & R.A. Hinde. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ingold, T.
(2000). The perception of the environment: essays on livelihood, dwelling &
skill. London ; New York: Routledge.
Jensen, A.R.
(1998). The g factor: the science of mental ability: Westport, USA: Praeger.
Klin, A.,
Sparrow, S.S., de Bildt, A., Cicchetti, D.V., Cohen, D.J. & Volkmar, F.R.
(1999). A normed study of face recognition in autism and related disorders.
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29: 499-508.
Lawrence, E.J.,
Shaw, P., Baker, D., Baron-Cohen, S. & David, A.S. (2004). Measuring
empathy: reliability and validity of the Empathy Quotient. Psychological
Medicine. 34: 911-19.
Lee, R.B. &
Daly, R.H. (1999). The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hunters and Gatherers.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lee, R.B. &
DeVore, I. (1968). Man the hunter. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter.
McGilchrist, I.
(2009). The master and his emissary: The divided brain and the making of the
western world: New Haven, USA: Yale University Press.
Miller, G.F.
(2000). The mating mind : how sexual choice shaped the evolution of human
nature. London: Heinemann.
Miller, G.F.
(2009). Spent: Sex, evolution, and consumer behavior: London: Viking.
Miller, G.F.
(2010). Are pleiotropic mutations and holocene selective sweeps the only
evolutionary genetic processes left for explaining heritable variation in human
psychological traits? In: D. M. Buss & P. H. Hawley (Eds.), The Evolution
of Personality and Individual Differences NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Premack, D. &
Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 1: 515-526.
Ridley, M.
(1997). The origins of virtue: London: Penguin.
Rosenkranz, P.
& Charlton, B.G. (2013). Individual differences in existential orientation:
Empathizing and systemizing explain the sex difference in religious orientation
and science acceptance. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 34: 119-146.
Rushton, J.P.
(1985). Differential-K theory and group-differencesin intelligence. Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 8: 239-240.
Symons, D.
(1980). The evolution of human-sexuality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3:
171-181.
Volk, A.A. &
Atkinson, J.A. (2013). Infant and child death in the human environment of
evolutionary adaptation. Evolution and Human Behaviour. 34: 182-92.
Voracek, M. &
Dressler, S.G. (2006). Lack of correlation between digit ratio (2D:4D) and
Baron-Cohen’s “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test, empathy, systemising, and
autism-spectrum quotients in a general population sample. Personality and
Individual Differences, 41: 1481-1491.
Wilson, M. &
Daly, M. (1992). The man who mistook his wife for a chattel. In J. H. Barkow,
L. Cosmides & J. Tooby (Eds.), The Adapted mind : evolutionary psychology
and the generation of culture. NY, USA: Oxford University Press, pp. 289-322.
Woodburn, J.
(1982). Egalitarian societies. Man 17: 431-451.
Woodley, M.A.
(2011). The cognitive differentiation-integration effort hypothesis: A
synthesis between the fitness indicator and life history models of human
intelligence. Review of General Psychology. 15: 228-45.
Ylvisaker, M.,
Feeney, T. & Szekeres, F. (1998). Social-environmental approach to
communication and behavior. In M. Ylvisaker (Ed.), Traumatic brain injury
rehabilitation: Children and adolescents. (2nd ed). Boston, US:
Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 271–302.
