*
Perhaps in this neglected spot is laid
Some heart once
pregnant with celestial fire;
Hands, that the rod
of empire might have sway'd,
Or waked to ecstasy
the living lyre.
But Knowledge to
their eyes her ample page
Rich with the spoils
of time did ne'er unroll;
Chill Penury
repress'd their noble rage,
And froze the genial
current of the soul.
Full many a gem of
purest ray serene
The dark unfathom'd
caves of ocean bear:
Full many a flower is
born to blush unseen,
And waste its
sweetness on the desert air.
Some village Hampden
that with dauntless breast
The little tyrant of
his fields withstood,
Some mute inglorious
Milton here may rest,
Some Cromwell
guiltless of his country's blood.
From Thomas Gray's Elegy written in a country churchyard
Note: this is a first rate poem - if you do not know it, take a look: http://www.bartleby.com/101/453.html
*
The idea of Mute Inglorious Miltons is intended to convey that creativity, and even creative genius, may have its effects and innovations may result - and yet the creative originator may be unknown and credit misallocated (for example, appropriated without acknowledgement by an uncreative person - or the provenance of the breakthrough simply lost to history) - or else the advance may simply be regarded as an obvious-next-step and taken for granted as having required nothing in the nature of creativity.
*
(Creativity is grossly undervalued by the uncreative - who are, as it were, 'tone deaf' to the operations of creativity. This is possible because creativity usually appears to be wrong, dysfunctional, silly -- and deriving from incompetence, ignorance, craziness, arrogance or some other undesirable trait in the creative person. And of course, more often than not, the products of creativity turn-out to be, indeed, relatively dysfunctional. But when creativity, rarely, leads to an improvement discernible even to the uncreative, then it no longer appears to be a breakthrough but merely a product of common sense.)
*
But my observations have suggested that only creative people generate innovations, and the majority of people are - in any given context - utterly uncreative and would never innovate, nor even improve (regardless of their intelligence).
I give two examples of uncreativity from my experience of methods in medicine and laboratory science.
1. Use of alcohol to clean skin before taking blood. When I was taught to take blood, I was told to sterilize the inner elbow with an alcohol swab, then to push the needle through the still wet alcohol in to the vein. This introduced alcohol under the skin where is produced an immediate painful stinging, like a bee sting - and this would be sustained for an hour or so after the blood had been taken.
On enquiry, I discovered that the alcohol could not possibly have any germ killing effect in the few seconds after application, so that it was working merely as a cleaning (not sterilizing) agent, and could (and should!) therefore be rubbed- or wiped-off before inserting the hypodermic needle.
Thereby leading to a great reduction in pain.
So hundreds, thousands of people, on millions of occasions, have inflicted needless pain when taking blood - simply because they were not creative, they were not able or motivated to want to improve the process.
(The same applies to the common but useless and pernicious practice of pressing on the hypodermic needle as it is withdrawn from the vein; thereby scratching the needle tip along the inner surface of the vein;, inducing deep pain of the kind that makes you faint and causing several days of aching.)
*
2. In preparing samples of human brain (post-mortem brain samples, I should make clear!) for the measurement of neurotransmitters, I needed to denature the structural protein of the brain. the approved method did this by 1. adding strong acid and 2. boiling the resultant mixture.
(Denature means to disrupt the 3-D structure of the protein, while preserving its chemical identity - this happens to the albumin when boiling an egg - the clear raw egg 'white' becomes white-and-opaque when boiled. The same effect could be achieved by adding a strong acid, with the obvious disadvantage to subsequent eating.)
When confronted by the hazardous requirement to boil multiple vessels containing concentrated acid I enquired why it was necessary to do both procedures - adding acid and boiling - when seemingly either of them alone would suffice to denature protein.
I tried the experiment of just boiling the brain (leaving out the acid) and the method worked just as well. So by dropping one step I saved a lot of time, and made the method safer.
But why had so many people been doing it wrong, wasting time, risking accidents - so often for so many years?
Furthermore, it was not necessary to boil the brain, since this kind of protein denatures at about 56 degrees Celsius (quoting from memory) - so I heated the brain to 80 degrees for a time long enough to ensure that it could do its job - and the protein was denatured without inconvenience, mess and hazard of dealing with boiling tubes.
Now, these modifications I made were not exactly 'rocket science' , but they were instances of creativity in action in an everyday setting - and the necessity for these micro-creative modifications provides examples the very low level of creativity of most people who devise and perform procedures and do things in everyday and institutional life.
*
Furthermore, such exaples of creativity are highly likely to be appropriated without acknowledgment - and this is fair enough, since they are tiny; but this neglect may give the false impression that creativity was not needed for them, that they were merely 'trial and error' of a kind which can simply be taken for granted.
Not so! - even this kind of creativity cannot be taken for granted but depends on specific individuals - albeit such individuals have not all that rare in England in recent years.
But that situation may not apply at all times and places, and sometimes therefore even micro-creativity is lacking in a social situation or a whole society - and then procedures will ossify and become irreversibly degraded with time.
*
Monday, 29 July 2013
Sunday, 28 July 2013
Implications of the group selection of genius?
*
Suppose that genius benefits group fitness rather than individual fitness, as seems likely to be the case - then this is a precarious situation.
If genius led to higher fitness, then the proportion of geniuses in a population would increase with each generation. But if genius is group selected then the genetic consequence of a genius is to expand the group - and this rising tide of group fitness will raise the boat of genius.
http://charltonteaching.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/the-reality-of-group-selection-and-not.html
*
A group-selection account of genius therefore (I think) suggests that genius grows in an expanding group, an expanding population - the outcome of genius being the expansion of that population - and the situation can only be sustained if the consequences of that expanding population include maintaining and promoting the causal requisites of more geniuses.
I think it is probably correct that each genius is a one-off - sui generis - not as a matter of necessity, but mostly because of the extreme unlikelihood of the occurrence same combination of abilities and personality factors.
This means that there is NOT a specific and definable 'genius-type' - which further means there cannot be a system for recognizing and promoting geniuses.
*
Which means that genius-type creativity cannot be taught, and can indeed only be described in a broad brush terms.
*
Add to the mix that geniuses are nearly always (not always) troublesome in one way or another - this goes with the territory because even if you cannot say with precision what the genius does do, what he does NOT doe is think like other people - and what kind of personality he does NOT have is one that goes with the flow of social consensus.
*
There are many consequences of this way of understanding genius - and one is that genius is tolerated rather than encouraged - and this especially applies at the local level of the people living around and with the genius - these will experience the problems of genius, but will not benefit from the genius any more than the rest of society.
Since the benefits of genius are general, there is an incentive, therefore, to shift the costs - let someone else, some other group, employ the genius and let them put up with him!
*
Further more, due to the activities of genius, a society, more exactly a human group - that group within which the genius functions - may abruptly switch from being one which tolerates genius for the sake of what he offers, to one which has... well some other attitude that could be actively anti-genius, or merely conformist, or short-termist, or non-functional...
(Non-functional in the sense that what genius offers is ultimately greater functionality, greater efficiency and/or effectiveness at some function - and if a group stops being concerned about functions, then there is no reason to tolerate genius.)
**
My reason for exploring this point is that at some point in the past few decades, British society went from being one which in practice tolerated genius, to one which is hostile to genius - and this can be seen at almost every level.
To read of such difficult, annoying, disruptive geniuses as Dirac or Wittgenstein, and then to realize that that were Professors at Cambridge - is to recognize that such characters would nowadays get nowhere near a Cambridge chair - not least because actual functional ability is not regarded as of primary importance in modern Britain.
I personally know of examples of supremely able and creative and productive people (as close to genius as we now get) who have been in practice (and for many and various 'excuses') excluded from positions in UK universities - not just once but repeatedly.
Mediocrity is zealously enforced by Head Girl types (of both sexes) whose sole concern is their own social micro-environment.
*
Modern Britain values Leftist ideals far, far more highly than the ability to do your 'job' - and I mean job in the ideal sense of performing a distinctive function.
What happens now is that instead of selecting people on the basis of how they do the job, the job is redefined to include the kind of people you want to select.
(This is, of course, the bureaucratic way of doing things - in which the bottom line is satisfying other bureaucrats whose bottom line is satisfying other bureaucrats - with bureaucratic 'turtles all the way down' and no bottom line of reality.)
So, in such a world as modern Britain, why tolerate difficult characters whose 'only' recommendation is that they are supremely good at the real job?
*
Thus a society with a high concentration of effective geniuses flipped quite suddenly into a society which is in practice and almost universally (at the relevant level of effect) actively anti-genius, selecting against genius, excluding of genius.
And the whole thing is denied by the simple expedient of re-labelling: in which some creative nonentity (maybe of high status, or a nutter) is simply stated to be a genius, talked about as a genius - probably given awards and medals for being a genius - and the concept of genius is thereby relativized and even further discredited!
*
Suppose that genius benefits group fitness rather than individual fitness, as seems likely to be the case - then this is a precarious situation.
If genius led to higher fitness, then the proportion of geniuses in a population would increase with each generation. But if genius is group selected then the genetic consequence of a genius is to expand the group - and this rising tide of group fitness will raise the boat of genius.
http://charltonteaching.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/the-reality-of-group-selection-and-not.html
*
A group-selection account of genius therefore (I think) suggests that genius grows in an expanding group, an expanding population - the outcome of genius being the expansion of that population - and the situation can only be sustained if the consequences of that expanding population include maintaining and promoting the causal requisites of more geniuses.
I think it is probably correct that each genius is a one-off - sui generis - not as a matter of necessity, but mostly because of the extreme unlikelihood of the occurrence same combination of abilities and personality factors.
This means that there is NOT a specific and definable 'genius-type' - which further means there cannot be a system for recognizing and promoting geniuses.
*
Which means that genius-type creativity cannot be taught, and can indeed only be described in a broad brush terms.
*
Add to the mix that geniuses are nearly always (not always) troublesome in one way or another - this goes with the territory because even if you cannot say with precision what the genius does do, what he does NOT doe is think like other people - and what kind of personality he does NOT have is one that goes with the flow of social consensus.
*
There are many consequences of this way of understanding genius - and one is that genius is tolerated rather than encouraged - and this especially applies at the local level of the people living around and with the genius - these will experience the problems of genius, but will not benefit from the genius any more than the rest of society.
Since the benefits of genius are general, there is an incentive, therefore, to shift the costs - let someone else, some other group, employ the genius and let them put up with him!
*
Further more, due to the activities of genius, a society, more exactly a human group - that group within which the genius functions - may abruptly switch from being one which tolerates genius for the sake of what he offers, to one which has... well some other attitude that could be actively anti-genius, or merely conformist, or short-termist, or non-functional...
(Non-functional in the sense that what genius offers is ultimately greater functionality, greater efficiency and/or effectiveness at some function - and if a group stops being concerned about functions, then there is no reason to tolerate genius.)
**
My reason for exploring this point is that at some point in the past few decades, British society went from being one which in practice tolerated genius, to one which is hostile to genius - and this can be seen at almost every level.
To read of such difficult, annoying, disruptive geniuses as Dirac or Wittgenstein, and then to realize that that were Professors at Cambridge - is to recognize that such characters would nowadays get nowhere near a Cambridge chair - not least because actual functional ability is not regarded as of primary importance in modern Britain.
I personally know of examples of supremely able and creative and productive people (as close to genius as we now get) who have been in practice (and for many and various 'excuses') excluded from positions in UK universities - not just once but repeatedly.
Mediocrity is zealously enforced by Head Girl types (of both sexes) whose sole concern is their own social micro-environment.
*
Modern Britain values Leftist ideals far, far more highly than the ability to do your 'job' - and I mean job in the ideal sense of performing a distinctive function.
What happens now is that instead of selecting people on the basis of how they do the job, the job is redefined to include the kind of people you want to select.
(This is, of course, the bureaucratic way of doing things - in which the bottom line is satisfying other bureaucrats whose bottom line is satisfying other bureaucrats - with bureaucratic 'turtles all the way down' and no bottom line of reality.)
So, in such a world as modern Britain, why tolerate difficult characters whose 'only' recommendation is that they are supremely good at the real job?
*
Thus a society with a high concentration of effective geniuses flipped quite suddenly into a society which is in practice and almost universally (at the relevant level of effect) actively anti-genius, selecting against genius, excluding of genius.
And the whole thing is denied by the simple expedient of re-labelling: in which some creative nonentity (maybe of high status, or a nutter) is simply stated to be a genius, talked about as a genius - probably given awards and medals for being a genius - and the concept of genius is thereby relativized and even further discredited!
*
Thursday, 25 July 2013
The Head Girl Syndrome - the opposite of creative genius
*
The ideal Head Girl is an all-rounder: performs extremely well in all school subjects and has a very high Grade Point Average. She is excellent at sports, Captaining all the major teams. She is also pretty, popular, sociable and well-behaved.
The Head Girl will probably be a big success in life, in whatever terms being a big success happens to be framed (she will gravitate towards such aspects of life) - so she might in some times and places make a Good Marriage and do a great job of raising a family; in another time and place she might go to a top-notch college and get a top-notch job - and pursue a glamorous and infertile lifestyle of 'serial monogamy'; with desirable mates.
But the Head Girl is not, cannot be, a creative genius.
*
Modern society is run by Head Girls, of both sexes, hence there is no place for the creative genius.
Modern Colleges aim at recruiting Head Girls, so do universities, so does science, so do the arts, so does the mass media, so does the legal profession, so does medicine, so does the military...
And in doing so, they filter-out and exclude creative genius.
*
The genius is pretty much everything the Head Girl is not. He is lop-sided in his abilities - truly excellent at some things or maybe just one thing, he is either hopeless or bored by many others. He won't work hard for long periods at things he does not want to do. He will not gravitate to the prestige areas of life, or cannot or will not do the networking necessary to get-on.
*
The Head Girl can never be a creative genius because she does what other people want by the standards they most value. She will worker harder and at a higher standard in doing whatever it is that social pressure tells her to do - and she will do this by whatever social standards prevail, only more thoroughly.
Meanwhile the creative genius will do what he does because he must.
*
The Head Girl will not ever want to alienate potentially powerful allies.
Meanwhile the creative genius is indifferent or hostile to the opinions of others so long as he knows he is right.
*
The Head Girl is great to have around, everybody thinks she is wonderful.
Meanwhile the creative genius is at best a person who divides opinion, strongly, in both directions - at worst often a signed-up member of the awkward squad.
*
The more selective the social system, the more it will tend to privilege the Head Girl and eliminate the creative genius.
Committees, peer review processes, voting - anything which requires interpersonal agreement and consensus - will favour the Head Girl and exclude the creative genius.
(Not least because committees are staffed by Head Girls, of both sexes, who naturally favour their own kind.)
*
We live in a Head Girl's world - which is also a world where creative genius is marginalized and disempowered to the point of near-complete invisibility.
*
The ideal Head Girl is an all-rounder: performs extremely well in all school subjects and has a very high Grade Point Average. She is excellent at sports, Captaining all the major teams. She is also pretty, popular, sociable and well-behaved.
The Head Girl will probably be a big success in life, in whatever terms being a big success happens to be framed (she will gravitate towards such aspects of life) - so she might in some times and places make a Good Marriage and do a great job of raising a family; in another time and place she might go to a top-notch college and get a top-notch job - and pursue a glamorous and infertile lifestyle of 'serial monogamy'; with desirable mates.
But the Head Girl is not, cannot be, a creative genius.
*
Modern society is run by Head Girls, of both sexes, hence there is no place for the creative genius.
Modern Colleges aim at recruiting Head Girls, so do universities, so does science, so do the arts, so does the mass media, so does the legal profession, so does medicine, so does the military...
And in doing so, they filter-out and exclude creative genius.
*
The genius is pretty much everything the Head Girl is not. He is lop-sided in his abilities - truly excellent at some things or maybe just one thing, he is either hopeless or bored by many others. He won't work hard for long periods at things he does not want to do. He will not gravitate to the prestige areas of life, or cannot or will not do the networking necessary to get-on.
*
The Head Girl can never be a creative genius because she does what other people want by the standards they most value. She will worker harder and at a higher standard in doing whatever it is that social pressure tells her to do - and she will do this by whatever social standards prevail, only more thoroughly.
Meanwhile the creative genius will do what he does because he must.
*
The Head Girl will not ever want to alienate potentially powerful allies.
Meanwhile the creative genius is indifferent or hostile to the opinions of others so long as he knows he is right.
*
The Head Girl is great to have around, everybody thinks she is wonderful.
Meanwhile the creative genius is at best a person who divides opinion, strongly, in both directions - at worst often a signed-up member of the awkward squad.
*
The more selective the social system, the more it will tend to privilege the Head Girl and eliminate the creative genius.
Committees, peer review processes, voting - anything which requires interpersonal agreement and consensus - will favour the Head Girl and exclude the creative genius.
(Not least because committees are staffed by Head Girls, of both sexes, who naturally favour their own kind.)
*
We live in a Head Girl's world - which is also a world where creative genius is marginalized and disempowered to the point of near-complete invisibility.
*
Creative genius probably requires lop-sided cogntive abilities (NOT all round high intelligence)
*
Given that the concept of 'g' or general intelligence breaks down at higher levels of cognitive ability - it is plausible that this may be a factor contributing to the highest levels of achievement which we call creative genius.
What this means is that it is not at all unusual to find that someone who is of exceptionally high intelligence in say mathematics is of only moderately (around average) intelligence in 'verbal IQ' - and vice versa - and it may be these specialists who are most likely to do the highest levels of creative work in their fields - rather than the all-rounders whose different subsets of cognitive ability are all approximately equally high.
Evidence for this comes from the many instances of measured or explicit dissociation between cognitive abilities among those of creative achievement - my favourite example is CS Lewis who was extremely creative, and apparently had an extremely high intelligence of the verbal IQ type - yet who was only about average in ability in mathematics so that he could not pass the basis 16-plus school examination (O-level) despite several attempts and with private tutoring.
Also, Anne Roe's Making of a Scientist (which is still just about the only thorough intelligence testing of top-notch scientists) shows considerable differences in the average scores of intelligence sub-scales both within and between scientific specialities. These averaged dissociations will have been even more marked, no doubt, at the individual level.
*
But I am perhaps most impressed by my own experience!
I think it is pretty clear (from many experiences, but recently including the breakdown of my IQ test scores for Mensa) that my own intelligence is in the top one percent for verbal IQ but much lower for mathematical and spatial types of intelligence - probably only in the top fifteen percent or thereabouts.
I did get a (top) grade A in O-level mathematics - which would put me in the top few percent, but then O-level mathematics is not very mathematical!
I also got a grade A at A-level (18-plus) physics - which would probably be in the top one percent - but the physics curriculum I studied (The Oxford Examination Board) was designed so that it could be done without A-level maths (as an aspiring medical student I thought it more important to do biology than maths - and I was correct) - and my understanding was therefore achieved by 'translating' physics into a non-mathematical form - which I managed to do, but it was hard work!
*
Later on I developed an interest in Epidemiology - the statistics of medicine and health - and found myself teaching basic statistics and writing papers on epidemiology - and I think I was pretty good at this (although I didn't much enjoy it - It didn't come easily)
Indeed, the highest level of eminence I reached in academia was as an epidemiologist - for example I was twice asked to apply for a Professorship in the subject at University of East Anglia, published a lot including in the top journals in the field and was asked to speak at major conferences.
My point here is that my high and distinctive ability in epidemiology and statistics was not despite my mediocre mathematical skills,but because of them. People in the field who found the maths easy, did not pause to consider the context of that maths, and failed to notice the problems of the way in which mathematics was being applied.
I therefore perceived problems in the mainstream understanding which were real and important - but which were slid-across by the mathematically expert - they whizzed past them so swiftly that they failed to see them.
*
I think my own case is actually an example of the way in which creativity generally works - creativity is a product of friction, and of a distinctive point of view.
Someone who has to translate mathematics into verbal terms is more likely to notice problems and possibilities and to make a distinctive contribution to the subject than is someone for whom it all comes effortlessly.
Clearly high ability of some kind is necessary to this process - but this may be a specific ability with relative weaknesses elsewhere which force the use of that special ability, and problems may yield to one kind of ability but not another.
*
In sum, it is lop-sidedness, the distinctive individual profile of abilities and deficiencies, which may contribute essentially to creative achievement - including that at genius level.
Given that the concept of 'g' or general intelligence breaks down at higher levels of cognitive ability - it is plausible that this may be a factor contributing to the highest levels of achievement which we call creative genius.
What this means is that it is not at all unusual to find that someone who is of exceptionally high intelligence in say mathematics is of only moderately (around average) intelligence in 'verbal IQ' - and vice versa - and it may be these specialists who are most likely to do the highest levels of creative work in their fields - rather than the all-rounders whose different subsets of cognitive ability are all approximately equally high.
Evidence for this comes from the many instances of measured or explicit dissociation between cognitive abilities among those of creative achievement - my favourite example is CS Lewis who was extremely creative, and apparently had an extremely high intelligence of the verbal IQ type - yet who was only about average in ability in mathematics so that he could not pass the basis 16-plus school examination (O-level) despite several attempts and with private tutoring.
Also, Anne Roe's Making of a Scientist (which is still just about the only thorough intelligence testing of top-notch scientists) shows considerable differences in the average scores of intelligence sub-scales both within and between scientific specialities. These averaged dissociations will have been even more marked, no doubt, at the individual level.
*
But I am perhaps most impressed by my own experience!
I think it is pretty clear (from many experiences, but recently including the breakdown of my IQ test scores for Mensa) that my own intelligence is in the top one percent for verbal IQ but much lower for mathematical and spatial types of intelligence - probably only in the top fifteen percent or thereabouts.
I did get a (top) grade A in O-level mathematics - which would put me in the top few percent, but then O-level mathematics is not very mathematical!
I also got a grade A at A-level (18-plus) physics - which would probably be in the top one percent - but the physics curriculum I studied (The Oxford Examination Board) was designed so that it could be done without A-level maths (as an aspiring medical student I thought it more important to do biology than maths - and I was correct) - and my understanding was therefore achieved by 'translating' physics into a non-mathematical form - which I managed to do, but it was hard work!
*
Later on I developed an interest in Epidemiology - the statistics of medicine and health - and found myself teaching basic statistics and writing papers on epidemiology - and I think I was pretty good at this (although I didn't much enjoy it - It didn't come easily)
Indeed, the highest level of eminence I reached in academia was as an epidemiologist - for example I was twice asked to apply for a Professorship in the subject at University of East Anglia, published a lot including in the top journals in the field and was asked to speak at major conferences.
My point here is that my high and distinctive ability in epidemiology and statistics was not despite my mediocre mathematical skills,but because of them. People in the field who found the maths easy, did not pause to consider the context of that maths, and failed to notice the problems of the way in which mathematics was being applied.
I therefore perceived problems in the mainstream understanding which were real and important - but which were slid-across by the mathematically expert - they whizzed past them so swiftly that they failed to see them.
*
I think my own case is actually an example of the way in which creativity generally works - creativity is a product of friction, and of a distinctive point of view.
Someone who has to translate mathematics into verbal terms is more likely to notice problems and possibilities and to make a distinctive contribution to the subject than is someone for whom it all comes effortlessly.
Clearly high ability of some kind is necessary to this process - but this may be a specific ability with relative weaknesses elsewhere which force the use of that special ability, and problems may yield to one kind of ability but not another.
*
In sum, it is lop-sidedness, the distinctive individual profile of abilities and deficiencies, which may contribute essentially to creative achievement - including that at genius level.
Friday, 19 July 2013
Dishonesty reduces applied intelligence: re-wires the brain
*
Surveying the modern intellectual scene, the world of public discourse among the educational elites, I conclude that dishonesty does not only reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of thinking - but it actually reduces applied intelligence - probably by re-wiring the brain.
*
What I am suggesting is that, although the fundamental efficiency of neural processing is an hereditary characteristic which is robust to environmental differences and changes (short of something like destructive brain pathology - encephalitis, neurotoxin, head injury, dementia etc) - habitual dishonesty (such as is mainstream among the modern intellectual elite) will generate brain changes, and a long-lasting (although probably, eventually, reversible) pathology in applied intelligence - such that what ought to be simple and obvious inferential reasoning becomes impossible.
*
I mean impossible.
Habitual dishonesty (most notable political correctness) is a form of learning; and learning strengthens some brain pathways and brain connections; while allowing other pathways and connections to wither and (perhaps eventually) perish.
Therefore, even on those rare occasions when a typical modern intellectual tries to be honest and to think straight - they cannot do it, because their reasoning processes have been sabotaged by their own repeated habits of dishonesty - their attempts at honest thoughts will be inhibited, and instead channelled down the usual lying pathways...
*
Thus, in modern intellectual life, honesty is punished and dishonesty is rewarded; honest brain pathways decay, dishonest brain pathways enlarge.
After years and years of conditioning in dishonesty, the typical modern intellectual (whether journalist, scientist, lawyer, teacher, doctor or whatever) becomes physically unable to think straight.
Thus the lack of common sense of the 'Clever Sillies' who rule modern societies, and who are driving them into suicide and self-destruction; may, in practice, be intractable - short of mass repentance and long-term rehabilitation and retraining of neural pathways and connections.
*
Reference: Clever Sillies - http://medicalhypotheses.blogspot.co.uk/2009/11/clever-sillies-why-high-iq-lack-common.html
Surveying the modern intellectual scene, the world of public discourse among the educational elites, I conclude that dishonesty does not only reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of thinking - but it actually reduces applied intelligence - probably by re-wiring the brain.
*
What I am suggesting is that, although the fundamental efficiency of neural processing is an hereditary characteristic which is robust to environmental differences and changes (short of something like destructive brain pathology - encephalitis, neurotoxin, head injury, dementia etc) - habitual dishonesty (such as is mainstream among the modern intellectual elite) will generate brain changes, and a long-lasting (although probably, eventually, reversible) pathology in applied intelligence - such that what ought to be simple and obvious inferential reasoning becomes impossible.
*
I mean impossible.
Habitual dishonesty (most notable political correctness) is a form of learning; and learning strengthens some brain pathways and brain connections; while allowing other pathways and connections to wither and (perhaps eventually) perish.
Therefore, even on those rare occasions when a typical modern intellectual tries to be honest and to think straight - they cannot do it, because their reasoning processes have been sabotaged by their own repeated habits of dishonesty - their attempts at honest thoughts will be inhibited, and instead channelled down the usual lying pathways...
*
Thus, in modern intellectual life, honesty is punished and dishonesty is rewarded; honest brain pathways decay, dishonest brain pathways enlarge.
After years and years of conditioning in dishonesty, the typical modern intellectual (whether journalist, scientist, lawyer, teacher, doctor or whatever) becomes physically unable to think straight.
Thus the lack of common sense of the 'Clever Sillies' who rule modern societies, and who are driving them into suicide and self-destruction; may, in practice, be intractable - short of mass repentance and long-term rehabilitation and retraining of neural pathways and connections.
*
Reference: Clever Sillies - http://medicalhypotheses.blogspot.co.uk/2009/11/clever-sillies-why-high-iq-lack-common.html
Is intelligence also personality?
*
In contrast to yesterday's posting, which attempts to differentiate qualitatively between intelligence and personality - with personality being something like the basic nature of the brain/ mind, and intelligence a measure of its efficiency - I am also drawn to the apparently contrary idea that intelligence is (or, at least, can be) personality.
For example, it seems very obvious to me that children of very high intelligence may have a distinctive personality, so tat even from an early age (maybe five?) they are recognizable as 'intelligent' children.
Yet, of course, their actual intelligence is well below the average for an adult in other words their performance of even a top one percent six year old on an IQ test normed for adults (or a measurement of their 'reading age', which is much the same) would place them well below an average 18 year old.
*
What, then, are we detecting in the highly intelligent child?
The usual answer is that we are implicitly comparing the highly intelligent six year old with other six year olds, and are noticing how much more able they are - but I think this is false. I believe that high intelligence can be recognized in a child even when you do not know their age, or even if you believed they were older than their true chronological age - in other words, I think there is a qualitative difference between the personality of the highly intelligent child and average children, which can be detected almost regardless of their actual level of performance.
It is not so much what they can do, cognitively; but the way that they do it - a matter of the mode of thinking rather than the efficiency of the thinking.
Indeed, I believe this is a very strong effect, which is underestimated by the fact that many/ most IQ tests are done against the clock - which underestimates the intelligence of that significant proportion of children with exceptionally high underlying intelligence, but who have sensory, motor, attentional (etc) impairments that reduce their speed/ accuracy of answering.
*
(Contra the received wisdom, I think that very high g has a cost, there is a developmental trade-off between intelligence and - for example, sprinting/jumping/throwing-type athleticism/ dancing/ personal combat ability; thus at the highest levels 'g' is not a reliable fitness marker - probably because of the necessary element of group selection in the occurrence of creative genius.)
*
In a sense, intelligence must, at least at extremes, affect personality; since at a certain point quantitative difference becomes qualitative. Someone with much more rapid processing will perform more processes in the finite available length of time in real world situations - such that the same sensory stimulus will typically lead to a different behavioural response.
*
This kind of difference is seldom measured in the usual psychological studies due to the problem of range restriction in samples - for example the use of college students restricts the range of intelligence to about two standard deviations, towards the upper end of the distribution - while the population as a whole requires four standard deviations to include 96 percent of the range.
Indeed, it is logistically very difficult/ in practice impossible, for most intelligence and personality researchers to sample the bottom of the intelligence range - since they lack access to special institutions and hospitals.
And, further, an institution/ hospital sample will include many with neurological and mental illness, and physical handicaps such that the usual tests will not be possible. In practice it is extremely difficult to sample people of low intelligence who are not also pathological - so the very obvious and characteristic differences in personality between those of very low and very high intelligence may not show up in the usual run of studies.
*
In contrast to yesterday's posting, which attempts to differentiate qualitatively between intelligence and personality - with personality being something like the basic nature of the brain/ mind, and intelligence a measure of its efficiency - I am also drawn to the apparently contrary idea that intelligence is (or, at least, can be) personality.
For example, it seems very obvious to me that children of very high intelligence may have a distinctive personality, so tat even from an early age (maybe five?) they are recognizable as 'intelligent' children.
Yet, of course, their actual intelligence is well below the average for an adult in other words their performance of even a top one percent six year old on an IQ test normed for adults (or a measurement of their 'reading age', which is much the same) would place them well below an average 18 year old.
*
What, then, are we detecting in the highly intelligent child?
The usual answer is that we are implicitly comparing the highly intelligent six year old with other six year olds, and are noticing how much more able they are - but I think this is false. I believe that high intelligence can be recognized in a child even when you do not know their age, or even if you believed they were older than their true chronological age - in other words, I think there is a qualitative difference between the personality of the highly intelligent child and average children, which can be detected almost regardless of their actual level of performance.
It is not so much what they can do, cognitively; but the way that they do it - a matter of the mode of thinking rather than the efficiency of the thinking.
Indeed, I believe this is a very strong effect, which is underestimated by the fact that many/ most IQ tests are done against the clock - which underestimates the intelligence of that significant proportion of children with exceptionally high underlying intelligence, but who have sensory, motor, attentional (etc) impairments that reduce their speed/ accuracy of answering.
*
(Contra the received wisdom, I think that very high g has a cost, there is a developmental trade-off between intelligence and - for example, sprinting/jumping/throwing-type athleticism/ dancing/ personal combat ability; thus at the highest levels 'g' is not a reliable fitness marker - probably because of the necessary element of group selection in the occurrence of creative genius.)
*
In a sense, intelligence must, at least at extremes, affect personality; since at a certain point quantitative difference becomes qualitative. Someone with much more rapid processing will perform more processes in the finite available length of time in real world situations - such that the same sensory stimulus will typically lead to a different behavioural response.
*
This kind of difference is seldom measured in the usual psychological studies due to the problem of range restriction in samples - for example the use of college students restricts the range of intelligence to about two standard deviations, towards the upper end of the distribution - while the population as a whole requires four standard deviations to include 96 percent of the range.
Indeed, it is logistically very difficult/ in practice impossible, for most intelligence and personality researchers to sample the bottom of the intelligence range - since they lack access to special institutions and hospitals.
And, further, an institution/ hospital sample will include many with neurological and mental illness, and physical handicaps such that the usual tests will not be possible. In practice it is extremely difficult to sample people of low intelligence who are not also pathological - so the very obvious and characteristic differences in personality between those of very low and very high intelligence may not show up in the usual run of studies.
*
Thursday, 18 July 2013
What is "personality"?
*
This is a tricky question - and one to which I do not have a settled answer.
But in the classic research programme into interpersonal differences (which was pioneered by HJ Eysenck), personality is regarded as distinct from intelligence.
This means that ideally there should be no significant correlation between personality and intelligence, but when there is there should be possible significant dissociations - such that high levels of a specific personality trait should be found with both low and high intelligence, with the same applying to low levels of that specific personality trait.
*
How this works can be seen in a draft, in press book chapter on the evolution of Simon Baron-Cohen's concepts of Systemizing and Empathizing (my co-author is Patrick Rosenkranz):
***
Empathizing and Systemizing conceptualized as personality traits
A disposition is a personality trait: understandable as a sustained tendency, an individual’s characteristic of habitually deploying a mode of cognition. A disposition can also be seen as an individual’s preference for using an ability. (In the sense that preferences can only select between a certain set of abilities; one cannot characteristically be disposed to act in any way that one is incapable of acting.).
And preference to behave in certain ways is (presumably) based on a motivation, and motivation is associated with a psychological reward (or gratification) from doing something – or else a psychological punishment (or aversive consequence) of not doing something. Ultimately, therefore, a disposition reflects that certain types of behaviour lead to increased gratification (increased pleasure or diminution of suffering). Individuals differ in the types of behaviour which lead to gratification, and in the degree of gratification associated with a specific type of behaviour.
In sum, individual and groups variations in Systemizing and Empathizing can be understood as variations in the type of behaviour that (on average) lead to gratification. Put simply, Empathizers gain enhanced gratification from Empathizing behaviour, while Systemizers gain enhanced gratification from Systemizing behaviour. For example, a High-Systemizer may have the ability to understand and empathize with other people, but prefers to spend most of his time doing crosswords; while a High-Empathizer may be able to do crosswords to a high standard, but she would prefer to converse with a group of friends.
Naturally, the disposition to be Empathizing or Systemizing requires that there be the cognitive ability to do these; to empathize requires the ability to empathize and to systemize requires that ability. And at extremes of disposition there may be a deficit in such abilities, so that the extreme Empathizer may be defective in systematizing ability and the extreme Systemizer may be defective in theory of mind ability.
However, deficiencies in either E or S ability are not necessary to the finding of variations in E-S, and it seems that there may be a wide range of E-S dispositions even when both abilities are fully intact. Therefore, these abilities must have evolved in order that there be a disposition to use them.
***
If intelligence and personality are regarded as autonomous; then this could be because personality is reducible to something like cognitive structure (maybe even to the formal properties of brain circuitry - the broad systematic principles upon which the brain is 'built')...
While intelligence could be reduced to something like processing speed - the efficiency (including rapidity) of cognitive processing - for instance as (crudely but objectively) measured by reaction times.
*
On this basis, how might personality be measurable, objectively?
It would ultimately be a matter of how the brain is setup - the principles on which it is organized.
The idea would be that different personalities would process information differently, according to different principles - and we are talking about qualitative differences, and specifically not about the rapidity of processing.
So, the same informational input would lead to different behavioural outputs, according to different personalities.
*
If this analysis is broadly correct, it can be seen why it has proved so much more difficult to measure and in particular to classify personality, than intelligence; since it does not seem obvious why there should be a fixed number of personality types except perhaps at broad categories of gene pools and in response to natural selection.
Much of personality difference would then be random variation, the results of many types of pathology, and the variation due to ongoing, unfinished 'selective sweeps' of natural selection - when past natural selection has produced personality change in a proportion of the population, but either this process is incomplete or else the direction of selection has changed.
*
This is a tricky question - and one to which I do not have a settled answer.
But in the classic research programme into interpersonal differences (which was pioneered by HJ Eysenck), personality is regarded as distinct from intelligence.
This means that ideally there should be no significant correlation between personality and intelligence, but when there is there should be possible significant dissociations - such that high levels of a specific personality trait should be found with both low and high intelligence, with the same applying to low levels of that specific personality trait.
*
How this works can be seen in a draft, in press book chapter on the evolution of Simon Baron-Cohen's concepts of Systemizing and Empathizing (my co-author is Patrick Rosenkranz):
***
Empathizing and Systemizing conceptualized as personality traits
Empathizing and Systemizing are conceptualized as
personality traits, dispositions or preferences to behave in certain
ways; therefore not as cognitive abilities.
E-S variations are thus not-necessarily
correlated with cognitive abilities – and indeed in some studies there is no
significant measurable correlation with cognitive abilities. For example, there
is neither a strong nor consistent association between the ‘reading the mind in
the eyes’ test (a test of a cognitive ability), and scores on a self-evaluation
Empathizing scale (a measure of disposition or personality): so that an
individual may score highly at reading the mind in the eyes but score low on an
Empathizing scale, or vice versa (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004;
Voracek & Dressler, 2006).
A disposition is a personality trait: understandable as a sustained tendency, an individual’s characteristic of habitually deploying a mode of cognition. A disposition can also be seen as an individual’s preference for using an ability. (In the sense that preferences can only select between a certain set of abilities; one cannot characteristically be disposed to act in any way that one is incapable of acting.).
And preference to behave in certain ways is (presumably) based on a motivation, and motivation is associated with a psychological reward (or gratification) from doing something – or else a psychological punishment (or aversive consequence) of not doing something. Ultimately, therefore, a disposition reflects that certain types of behaviour lead to increased gratification (increased pleasure or diminution of suffering). Individuals differ in the types of behaviour which lead to gratification, and in the degree of gratification associated with a specific type of behaviour.
In sum, individual and groups variations in Systemizing and Empathizing can be understood as variations in the type of behaviour that (on average) lead to gratification. Put simply, Empathizers gain enhanced gratification from Empathizing behaviour, while Systemizers gain enhanced gratification from Systemizing behaviour. For example, a High-Systemizer may have the ability to understand and empathize with other people, but prefers to spend most of his time doing crosswords; while a High-Empathizer may be able to do crosswords to a high standard, but she would prefer to converse with a group of friends.
Naturally, the disposition to be Empathizing or Systemizing requires that there be the cognitive ability to do these; to empathize requires the ability to empathize and to systemize requires that ability. And at extremes of disposition there may be a deficit in such abilities, so that the extreme Empathizer may be defective in systematizing ability and the extreme Systemizer may be defective in theory of mind ability.
However, deficiencies in either E or S ability are not necessary to the finding of variations in E-S, and it seems that there may be a wide range of E-S dispositions even when both abilities are fully intact. Therefore, these abilities must have evolved in order that there be a disposition to use them.
***
If intelligence and personality are regarded as autonomous; then this could be because personality is reducible to something like cognitive structure (maybe even to the formal properties of brain circuitry - the broad systematic principles upon which the brain is 'built')...
While intelligence could be reduced to something like processing speed - the efficiency (including rapidity) of cognitive processing - for instance as (crudely but objectively) measured by reaction times.
*
On this basis, how might personality be measurable, objectively?
It would ultimately be a matter of how the brain is setup - the principles on which it is organized.
The idea would be that different personalities would process information differently, according to different principles - and we are talking about qualitative differences, and specifically not about the rapidity of processing.
So, the same informational input would lead to different behavioural outputs, according to different personalities.
*
If this analysis is broadly correct, it can be seen why it has proved so much more difficult to measure and in particular to classify personality, than intelligence; since it does not seem obvious why there should be a fixed number of personality types except perhaps at broad categories of gene pools and in response to natural selection.
Much of personality difference would then be random variation, the results of many types of pathology, and the variation due to ongoing, unfinished 'selective sweeps' of natural selection - when past natural selection has produced personality change in a proportion of the population, but either this process is incomplete or else the direction of selection has changed.
*
Monday, 1 July 2013
What does dog intelligence tell us about possible causes of the decline of human intelligence?
*
The causes of the significant decline in intelligence in the past 150 or so years include
1. Differential reproduction such that the less intelligent have higher reproductive success than the more intelligent.
2. Relaxation of natural selection on those of lowest intelligence, due to the massive decline in child mortality rates - leading to an accumulation of deleterious mutations
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/what-are-genetic-causes-of-dysgenic.html
*
Can the estimated intelligence of dogs tell us anything about the plausibility of the second of these mechanisms?
I made a blind hypothesis that (English) bulldogs would be among the least intelligent of dogs, due to my knowledge of the fact that most bulldogs have been, for several generations, born by Caesarian section, and that this would be consistent with a relaxation of natural selection
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulldog#Health
I also hypothesized that dogs selected for the functional abilities (working dogs) - thus subjected to natural selection for ability; would be of higher intelligence than dogs selected for their appearance (show dogs - which would include bulldogs) - since these dogs would selectively be kept alive and bred from, even when subject to what would, in natural conditions, be fitness-impairing problems.
*
On consulting the Wikipedia page on The Intelligence of Dogs
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Intelligence_of_Dogs
I found my hypotheses both to be broadly consistent with the data:
Lowest Degree of Working/Obedience Intelligence
There are apparent inconsistencies - such that Poodles and Papillons seem like show dogs, despite their intelligence; while Beagles used to be hunting dogs and bloodhounds used to be tracker dogs which would suggest they ought to have higher intelligence.
However, perhaps some of these data (Papillons?) are wrong; or the big Poodles are still used as working (gun) dogs; and perhaps pedigree Beagles and Bloodhounds have not been working dogs for many generations, and are now show dogs?
*
Anyway - I present the data for what its worth.
As I say, it seems broadly consistent with my hypotheses based on the idea that relaxation of natural selection could rapidly lead to a decline in intelligence, due to accumulated deleterious mutations.
*
The causes of the significant decline in intelligence in the past 150 or so years include
1. Differential reproduction such that the less intelligent have higher reproductive success than the more intelligent.
2. Relaxation of natural selection on those of lowest intelligence, due to the massive decline in child mortality rates - leading to an accumulation of deleterious mutations
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/what-are-genetic-causes-of-dysgenic.html
*
Can the estimated intelligence of dogs tell us anything about the plausibility of the second of these mechanisms?
I made a blind hypothesis that (English) bulldogs would be among the least intelligent of dogs, due to my knowledge of the fact that most bulldogs have been, for several generations, born by Caesarian section, and that this would be consistent with a relaxation of natural selection
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulldog#Health
I also hypothesized that dogs selected for the functional abilities (working dogs) - thus subjected to natural selection for ability; would be of higher intelligence than dogs selected for their appearance (show dogs - which would include bulldogs) - since these dogs would selectively be kept alive and bred from, even when subject to what would, in natural conditions, be fitness-impairing problems.
*
On consulting the Wikipedia page on The Intelligence of Dogs
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Intelligence_of_Dogs
I found my hypotheses both to be broadly consistent with the data:
Brightest Dogs
- Understanding of New Commands: Fewer than 5 repetitions.
- Obey First Command: 95% of the time or better.
- Border Collie
- Poodle
- German Shepherd
- Golden Retriever
- Doberman Pinscher
- Shetland Sheepdog
- Labrador Retriever
- Papillon
- Rottweiler
- Australian Cattle Dog
Lowest Degree of Working/Obedience Intelligence
- Shih Tzu
- Basset Hound
- Mastiff
Beagle - Pekingese
- Bloodhound
- Borzoi
- Chow Chow
- Bulldog
- Basenji
- Afghan Hound
There are apparent inconsistencies - such that Poodles and Papillons seem like show dogs, despite their intelligence; while Beagles used to be hunting dogs and bloodhounds used to be tracker dogs which would suggest they ought to have higher intelligence.
However, perhaps some of these data (Papillons?) are wrong; or the big Poodles are still used as working (gun) dogs; and perhaps pedigree Beagles and Bloodhounds have not been working dogs for many generations, and are now show dogs?
*
Anyway - I present the data for what its worth.
As I say, it seems broadly consistent with my hypotheses based on the idea that relaxation of natural selection could rapidly lead to a decline in intelligence, due to accumulated deleterious mutations.
*
Monday, 24 June 2013
Eysenck's personality trait of Psychoticism as the primary underlying disposition, underpinning most other traits
*
Background:
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/creativity-and-eysencks-psychoticism.html
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2012/09/evolution-of-creative-genius-in.html
It may be that Eysenck's personality trait of Psychoticism is the primary dimension of personality in humans - that which underlies and explains (and valuably-reconceptualizes) other personality traits such as Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion-Introversion, Schizotypy and Self-esteem.
*
Here, as a reminder, is a summary of some of the defining characteristics of Psychoticism as they appear in self-reported personality evaluations:
High Psychoticism is in bold font; Low Psychoticism is normal font.
1. Cold - versus warm, charming
2. Aggressive - versus submissive
3. Egocentric - versus follows groups expectations
4. Unempathic - versus sympathetic, feels the emotions of others
5. Tough-minded (i.e. impervious to events) - versus tender-minded, strongly affected by experience
6. Antisocial - versus gregarious, needs other people
7. Impersonal - versus life consists of intense, direct relationships
8. Impulsive (behaviour dominated by current emotions) - versus behaviour dominated by predictions or weaker emotions.
9. Creative - versus applies peer-approved, learned rules and traditions
[Note added 18 July 2013: I don't find the characterization of emotionally-cold to be quite correct. Indeed, it is probably misleading. High Psychoticism is more likely to be interpersonally spontaneous and natural - which could be engaging and pleasant or, in another person, selfish and cruel; while low Pychoticism would be lacking in these qualities - more conventional, polite, careful, 'diplomatic'...]
The underlying distinction here is, I suggest, related to the orientation-of, or domination-of, Short Term Memory (STM)
(STM includes explicit memory, awareness, attention, conscious will and deliberation - our 'self' as we perceive and know it directly.).
*
High Psychoticism (P) is the orientation of STM toward Long Term Memory (LTM), and the subordination of STM to the associative processes of LTM.
Low Psychoticism is the suppression of this natural state of domination of the STM by the LTM - and instead an 'outward looking' orientation of STM towards the external perceptual (sensory) environment.
So, high P is about inner/ memory worlds, while low P is about outer/ sensory worlds - and the cognitive difference between them relates to the contrasted associative logic of long term and short term memory.
*
The natural (more evolutionarily ancient) state is high Psychoticism (see second link above about evolution of creative genius) - this is characterized by
1. A dream-like/ psychosis-like mode of highly associative thinking reflective of the functioning of LTM (i.e. high schizotypy, dream/psychosis-like mentation).
This happens because STM (and awareness) is orientated towards memories, and dominated by the way that memories are processed; rather than the external environment.
It is this mode of high Psychoticism thinking which is creative, due to its exceptionally wide field of association/ connection-making; and which - when combined with high intelligence, drive and luck, leads to that rare but vital phenomenon of Genius (see HJ Eysenck's 1995 book Genius).
*
2. A relatively inner-dominated, hence inward-looking disposition which is seen as being:
a. Low in Agreebleness/ Empathy - because less orientated-towards and concerned-by other people feelings.
b. High in self-esteem - due to autonomy-from, indifference-to, the evaluations of other people.
c. Low in Conscientiousness - since C. is about subordination to an understanding of what 'other people' say is important, instead of what you personally feel to be important.
d. Introverted - because not very interested by other people, hence not reliant upon other people for psychological stimulation, hence likely to be less compulsively sociable.
Introversion may also be seen as a kind of self-sufficiency, autonomy, lack of need for external stimulus - which fits with the above conceptualization of Psychoticism.
*
(Note: Eysenck, of course, had Introversion as a separate dimension from Psychoticism - but J Philippe Rushton's work on the General Factor Personality (GFP) showed that there is an underlying association between most of the main personality variables. Furthermore, I consider the Extraversion-Introversion dimension to be somewhat ill-formed by the excessive emphasis in questionnaires on social interactions as if these were the primary characteristic of Extraversion - which misses out the important sub-group of Autistic-Extraverts. This idea I am presenting about Psychoticism is therefore, to a considerable extent, a re-framing of Rushton's GFP as the inverse of Psychoticism, but with Psychoticism regarded as primary and high GFP as a more recently, and variously, evolved disposition.)
*
However, low Psychoticism is the commonest-personality type among the indigenous population in Western and East Asian Societies (especially in East Asia).
The person of low Psychoticism experiences life via Short Term Memory that has become, to a considerable extent, cut-off from (oriented-away from, independent of) the dream- or psychosis-like inner world of LTM; and instead is oreintated to the external environment as revealed from the senses and as evaluated by the explicitly experienced and narrowly 'rational' processes of STM.
The person of low Psychoticism is focused on the surrounding world, the world of vision (especially), and - due to selection pressures - the social world of other people. Hence a person of low Psychoticism is Empathic/ Agreeable (sensitive to the feelings of others), Conscientious and gaining the greatest satisfaction in performing socially-valued tasks, and low in impulsivity in the sense of suppressing actions that derive from unconscious long-term memory associations.
*
A person of low Psychoticism is extraverted, in the sense that they require strong external (and usually social) inputs in order to maintain arousal.
However, the picture is muddied by 'autistic' extraverts,
http://charltonteaching.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/autistic-extravert-reflections-on.html
who require external stimulus, but of a non-social kind.
(This is in contrast to the low P introvert, whose stimulus comes interacting with the powerful associations deriving from their own LTM.)
*
A person of low Psychoticism is un-creative, because they perceive reality at 'face value' of whatever comes to them via perception and social norms as analyzed by the relatively simple and limited 'rational' and 'explicit' processing of Short Term Memory.
By contrast, the high Psychoticism person deals has a greater tendency to deploy the much greater capacity system of Long Term Memory - with its vastly greater range of stored information, and the ability to consider associations among these memories, going beyond those of the narrow 'rationality' of STM.
Hence the positive association between high Psychoticism and creativity
*
So, Psychoticism can be seen as the major general personality trait, underlying many of the other more specific traits for fundamental reasons to do with the nature of cognitive processing.
*
Background:
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/creativity-and-eysencks-psychoticism.html
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2012/09/evolution-of-creative-genius-in.html
It may be that Eysenck's personality trait of Psychoticism is the primary dimension of personality in humans - that which underlies and explains (and valuably-reconceptualizes) other personality traits such as Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion-Introversion, Schizotypy and Self-esteem.
*
Here, as a reminder, is a summary of some of the defining characteristics of Psychoticism as they appear in self-reported personality evaluations:
High Psychoticism is in bold font; Low Psychoticism is normal font.
1. Cold - versus warm, charming
2. Aggressive - versus submissive
3. Egocentric - versus follows groups expectations
4. Unempathic - versus sympathetic, feels the emotions of others
5. Tough-minded (i.e. impervious to events) - versus tender-minded, strongly affected by experience
6. Antisocial - versus gregarious, needs other people
7. Impersonal - versus life consists of intense, direct relationships
8. Impulsive (behaviour dominated by current emotions) - versus behaviour dominated by predictions or weaker emotions.
9. Creative - versus applies peer-approved, learned rules and traditions
[Note added 18 July 2013: I don't find the characterization of emotionally-cold to be quite correct. Indeed, it is probably misleading. High Psychoticism is more likely to be interpersonally spontaneous and natural - which could be engaging and pleasant or, in another person, selfish and cruel; while low Pychoticism would be lacking in these qualities - more conventional, polite, careful, 'diplomatic'...]
The underlying distinction here is, I suggest, related to the orientation-of, or domination-of, Short Term Memory (STM)
(STM includes explicit memory, awareness, attention, conscious will and deliberation - our 'self' as we perceive and know it directly.).
*
High Psychoticism (P) is the orientation of STM toward Long Term Memory (LTM), and the subordination of STM to the associative processes of LTM.
Low Psychoticism is the suppression of this natural state of domination of the STM by the LTM - and instead an 'outward looking' orientation of STM towards the external perceptual (sensory) environment.
So, high P is about inner/ memory worlds, while low P is about outer/ sensory worlds - and the cognitive difference between them relates to the contrasted associative logic of long term and short term memory.
*
The natural (more evolutionarily ancient) state is high Psychoticism (see second link above about evolution of creative genius) - this is characterized by
1. A dream-like/ psychosis-like mode of highly associative thinking reflective of the functioning of LTM (i.e. high schizotypy, dream/psychosis-like mentation).
This happens because STM (and awareness) is orientated towards memories, and dominated by the way that memories are processed; rather than the external environment.
It is this mode of high Psychoticism thinking which is creative, due to its exceptionally wide field of association/ connection-making; and which - when combined with high intelligence, drive and luck, leads to that rare but vital phenomenon of Genius (see HJ Eysenck's 1995 book Genius).
*
2. A relatively inner-dominated, hence inward-looking disposition which is seen as being:
a. Low in Agreebleness/ Empathy - because less orientated-towards and concerned-by other people feelings.
b. High in self-esteem - due to autonomy-from, indifference-to, the evaluations of other people.
c. Low in Conscientiousness - since C. is about subordination to an understanding of what 'other people' say is important, instead of what you personally feel to be important.
d. Introverted - because not very interested by other people, hence not reliant upon other people for psychological stimulation, hence likely to be less compulsively sociable.
Introversion may also be seen as a kind of self-sufficiency, autonomy, lack of need for external stimulus - which fits with the above conceptualization of Psychoticism.
*
(Note: Eysenck, of course, had Introversion as a separate dimension from Psychoticism - but J Philippe Rushton's work on the General Factor Personality (GFP) showed that there is an underlying association between most of the main personality variables. Furthermore, I consider the Extraversion-Introversion dimension to be somewhat ill-formed by the excessive emphasis in questionnaires on social interactions as if these were the primary characteristic of Extraversion - which misses out the important sub-group of Autistic-Extraverts. This idea I am presenting about Psychoticism is therefore, to a considerable extent, a re-framing of Rushton's GFP as the inverse of Psychoticism, but with Psychoticism regarded as primary and high GFP as a more recently, and variously, evolved disposition.)
*
However, low Psychoticism is the commonest-personality type among the indigenous population in Western and East Asian Societies (especially in East Asia).
The person of low Psychoticism experiences life via Short Term Memory that has become, to a considerable extent, cut-off from (oriented-away from, independent of) the dream- or psychosis-like inner world of LTM; and instead is oreintated to the external environment as revealed from the senses and as evaluated by the explicitly experienced and narrowly 'rational' processes of STM.
The person of low Psychoticism is focused on the surrounding world, the world of vision (especially), and - due to selection pressures - the social world of other people. Hence a person of low Psychoticism is Empathic/ Agreeable (sensitive to the feelings of others), Conscientious and gaining the greatest satisfaction in performing socially-valued tasks, and low in impulsivity in the sense of suppressing actions that derive from unconscious long-term memory associations.
*
A person of low Psychoticism is extraverted, in the sense that they require strong external (and usually social) inputs in order to maintain arousal.
However, the picture is muddied by 'autistic' extraverts,
http://charltonteaching.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/autistic-extravert-reflections-on.html
who require external stimulus, but of a non-social kind.
(This is in contrast to the low P introvert, whose stimulus comes interacting with the powerful associations deriving from their own LTM.)
*
A person of low Psychoticism is un-creative, because they perceive reality at 'face value' of whatever comes to them via perception and social norms as analyzed by the relatively simple and limited 'rational' and 'explicit' processing of Short Term Memory.
By contrast, the high Psychoticism person deals has a greater tendency to deploy the much greater capacity system of Long Term Memory - with its vastly greater range of stored information, and the ability to consider associations among these memories, going beyond those of the narrow 'rationality' of STM.
Hence the positive association between high Psychoticism and creativity
*
So, Psychoticism can be seen as the major general personality trait, underlying many of the other more specific traits for fundamental reasons to do with the nature of cognitive processing.
*
Tuesday, 28 May 2013
Approx 1 SD decline in general intelligence since 1889 confirmed in a near-perfectly-matched sample from 1989
*
Michael A. Woodley, Jan te Nijenhuis & Raegan Murphy have followed up their long-term analysis of reaction times as evidence of a rapid and significant decline in average intelligence since Victorian times
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/the-decline-in-general-intelligence.html
by publishing a rapid and robust refutation of the criticism that this result could be explained-away by differential sampling.
http://drjamesthompson.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/original-paper-high-quality-replication.html
They present a modern population sample from 1989 which is (as-near-as-dammit in this imperfect world) perfectly--matched with Francis Galton's sample from the late 19th century.
The 1989 sample had an average reaction time of 245 milliseconds compared with Galtons 1889 average reaction time of much slower average reaction time of 194 ms - confirming Woodley at al's identification of a decline of general intelligence of approximately one standard deviation, or 15 IQ points.
*
This unusual compression of the time-scale of scientific debate presents a litmus test of the honesty and competence among the commentators who rejected the original paper on micro-methodological grounds of having serious concerns about sampling issues; grounds which I argued were inappropriate, incompetent and - in their effect - anti-scientific:
http://charltonteaching.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/extraordinary-claims-require.html
Thus we are now in a position to observe whether such critics understand and acknowledge that they have in fact been refuted; or else whether they reveal the existence of some hidden agenda by maintaining their rubbishing and rejection of the Woodley et al paper by ignoring this refutation, or shifting the grounds for criticism.
**
http://drjamesthompson.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/original-paper-high-quality-replication.html
***
Michael A. Woodley, Jan te Nijenhuis & Raegan Murphy have followed up their long-term analysis of reaction times as evidence of a rapid and significant decline in average intelligence since Victorian times
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/the-decline-in-general-intelligence.html
by publishing a rapid and robust refutation of the criticism that this result could be explained-away by differential sampling.
http://drjamesthompson.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/original-paper-high-quality-replication.html
They present a modern population sample from 1989 which is (as-near-as-dammit in this imperfect world) perfectly--matched with Francis Galton's sample from the late 19th century.
The 1989 sample had an average reaction time of 245 milliseconds compared with Galtons 1889 average reaction time of much slower average reaction time of 194 ms - confirming Woodley at al's identification of a decline of general intelligence of approximately one standard deviation, or 15 IQ points.
*
This unusual compression of the time-scale of scientific debate presents a litmus test of the honesty and competence among the commentators who rejected the original paper on micro-methodological grounds of having serious concerns about sampling issues; grounds which I argued were inappropriate, incompetent and - in their effect - anti-scientific:
http://charltonteaching.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/extraordinary-claims-require.html
Thus we are now in a position to observe whether such critics understand and acknowledge that they have in fact been refuted; or else whether they reveal the existence of some hidden agenda by maintaining their rubbishing and rejection of the Woodley et al paper by ignoring this refutation, or shifting the grounds for criticism.
**
ORIGINAL PAPER: A high-quality replication of Galton’s study one century later: Wilkinson & Allison (1989)
Michael
A. Woodley, Jan te Nijenhuis & Raegan Murphy
In
Woodley, te Nijenhuis, and Murphy (2013, in press) we argue that intelligence
has declined substantially since Victorian times, based on a meta-analysis of
simple reaction time. An exchange of ideas started at several blogs. We hereby
reply to the blogposts of Scott Alexander and HBD Chick, reacting to an earlier
post made by us.
A paper
has come to our attention that provides strong evidence against the supposed
representativeness problem across cohorts (e.g. Alexander, 2013). The study in
question is that of Wilkinson and Allison (1989) using a sample of 5,324
visitors to the London Science Museum, which is situated at the exact site of
Galton’s 19th century Anthropometric Laboratory in South Kensington.
All visitors undertook psychophysical
testing on a simple reaction time-measuring apparatus, just as the people in
Galton’s study did. Of these mixed-sex participants 1,189 were aged between 20
and 29, and are thus highly similar to the age range
employed in our own study. Their simple RT mean was substantially slower than the weighted 1889 RT mean (245 ms vs. 194.06
ms), and furthermore the mean of this sample falls very close to the meta-regression-estimated mean across studies for
the late 1980s (approximately 250 ms, see: Figure 1 in Woodley, te Nijenhuis
& Murphy, 2013). The remarkable features of this study are the ways in
which it replicates virtually every significant demographic aspect of Galton’s
study.
There
is the issue of a participation fee. Galton is known to have requested a
participation fee of 3 pennies (approximately £5 in modern UK currency). The London Science Museum required the
payment of an admissions fee right up until December 2001. Furthermore it still
requires the payment of fees of £6 to
£10 for access to some special
exhibitions (London Science Museum, 2013a). The Wilkinson and Allison (1989)
study was in fact conducted as part of a special exhibition entitled Medicines for Man, which was hosted by
the Museum from the early 1980s (Medicines for Man Organizing Committee, 1980).
Therefore participation fees were employed in the case of both studies.
There
is strong evidence for the demographic convergence between the two studies.
Johnson et al. (1985) indicate that whilst Galton’s sample included persons
from all occupational and socioeconomic groups in Victorian London, it was
nonetheless skewed towards students and professionals, and both groups could
fairly be described as solidly White and middle class. In the last decades of
the 20th century, museum attendance in the UK exhibited precisely
the same skew in terms of sociodemography. Eckstein and Feist (1992) for example
noted that most UK museum visitors are drawn from White and upper-middle-class
populations. Furthermore Hooper-Greenhill (1994) observed that the largest
minority ethnic groups in the UK (i.e. Asians and Afro-Caribbeans) are
underrepresented amongst museum visitors. In acknowledging this issue, a House
of Commons report in 2002 stated that free admission to museums would unlikely
‘… be effective in attracting significant numbers of new visitors from the
widest range of socio-economic and ethic groups’ (House of Commons report,
2002, p. 23).
The
presence of this self-selection amongst visitors strongly harmonizes the studies of Galton and Wilkinson and Allison.
Add to this the fact that participation fees were employed in both cases, the
fact that the geographical locations were exactly the same and finally the fact
that the age demographic of interest (i.e. twenty-somethings) were intensively
sampled in both cases (i.e. 3,410 in the case of Silverman’s subset of Galton’s
sample and 1,189 in the case of Wilkinson and Allison). The net of this is that
the studies become even more strongly
convergent in terms of comparing like with like. Thus the argument of more heterogeneous samples
visiting museums in the 1980s compared to more restricted samples visiting museums
in the 1880s is critically weakened. The principal objections that can be
leveled against this are as follows.
Firstly
there is the issue of tourism. Most tourists to the UK are from the US and
Europe (Tourism 3B), meaning that they are likely to be both ethnically and
socioeconomically matched to the majority of the participants in this study
(i.e. UK citizens). In fact, international arrivals in the United Kingdom in
1990 show that of the 439 million inbound tourists, 60% were European in origin
and 21% emanated from the Americas. Hence, 81% of the tourist population came
from groups which are highly ethnically similar to the British. Only 12% came
from Asia and the Pacific with a meager 3% coming from the Middle East and 2%
from Africa (Tourism 3B). In sum, it is unlikely that tourists being tested in
the 1989 study were substantially ethnically different from the typical UK
museum visitor. Based on current statistics from the Science Museum, the
preponderance of visitors hail from the UK (69%) and the preponderance of those
are from Greater London (44%; London Science Museum, 2013b). Historically,
especially prior to the 1990s this figure would have been much higher, owing to
far lower levels of tourism to the UK (in 1990 international tourism levels
were less than half the current levels, >940
million per year, BBC, 2013). This means that in all likelihood well over 70%
of the participants in Wilkinson and Allison’s study would have been British,
and the overwhelming majority of these would have been White, upper
middle-class and from London. The overwhelming majority of the international visitors
would have been ethnically and broadly socioeconomically matched to the British
visitors.
Secondly
is the issue of instrumentation. Galton utilized a pendulum chronoscope with a
temporal resolution of around a centi-second (i.e. 1/100th of a
second, or 0.01 seconds). The electronic apparatus employed by Wilkinson and Allison
in all likelihood had a higher resolution (post-1908 chronoscopy at least had
the potential to be accurate to a single milli-second; Haupt, 2001), however a
centi-second level only resolution in Galton’s apparatus cannot account for the
substantial discrepancies between these two studies.
Thirdly,
Galton’s sample was single person-single trial, whereas Wilkinson and Allison’s
study employed two practice trials followed by 10 trials per person for the
purposes of averaging. This protocol would almost certainly have enhanced the
reliability of Wilkinson and Allison’s data relative to Galton’s (Jensen,
1980); however in both cases we are dealing with aggregates. Strong biases
(i.e. jumping the gun vs. slow to start) have the potential to cancel each
other out when employing these sorts of very large datasets, as these sources
of error are distributed in a Gaussian fashion. This means that aggregate-level
mean-wise comparisons are appropriate for comparisons between data exhibiting
different coefficients of reliability coupled with very large Ns.
On
this basis Wilkinson and Allison’s (1989) study must be considered an excellent
replication of Galton’s study. Its mean reaction time for the relevant age
cohort is almost precisely where our meta-regression predicts it should be.
This is clearly strong supporting evidence for the robustness of the increase
in simple RT latency produced to date and so puts even more nails in the coffin
of those who argue that the trend can be accounted for by lack of
representativeness across cohorts.
References
Alexander,
S. S. (2013). The wisdom of the ancients. Slate
Star Codex. URL: http://slatestarcodex.com/2013/05/22/the-wisdom-of-the-ancients/ [retrieved on 24/05/13]
BBC.
(2013).
GCSE Bitesize. Geography tourism trends.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/geography/tourism/tourism_trends_rev1.shtml
Eskstein,
J. & Feist, A. (1992). Cultural
Trends, 1991. London, Policy Studies Institute.
Haupt,
E. J. (2001). Laboratories for experimental psychology: Gottingen’s ascendancy
over Leipzig in the 1890s. In: Rieber, R. W., & Robinson, D. K. (Eds.), Wilhelm
Wundt in History. The Making of a Scientific Psychology. (pp. 205-250). New
York: Kluwer Academic.
Hooper-Greenhill,
E. (1994). Museums and their Visitors.
London, Routledge.
House of Commons, Culture, Media
and Sport Committee (2002). National
Museums and Galleries: Funding and free admission. House of Commons, United
Kingdom.
Jensen,
A. R. (1980). Bias in Mental Testing.
New York: Free Press.
Johnson,
R. C., McClearn, G., Yuen, S., Nagosha, C. T., Abern, F. M., & Cole, R. E.
(1985). Galton's data a century later. American
Psychologist, 40, 875–892.
Medicines
for Man Organizing Committee. (1980). Medicines
for Man: A Booklet Based on an Exhibition at the Science Museum about Medicines
- how They are Discovered and how They Work, how They are Made and Tested, how
They are Prescribed and Dispensed, and how Laws Control Their Use. London,
Science Museum.
No
author (no date). Tourism 3 SB.
Oxford University Press
London
Science Museum. (2013a). http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/visitmuseum/prices.aspx
[retrieved on 27/05/2013]
London
Science Museum. (2013b). http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/about_us/history/facts_and_figures.aspx
[retrieved on 27/05/2013]
Wilkinson,
R. T., & Allison, S. (1989). Age and simple reaction time: Decade
differences for 5,324 subjects. Journal
of Gerontology, 44, 29–35.
Woodley,
M. A., te Nijenhuis, J., & Murphy, R. (2013). Were the Victorians cleverer
than us? The decline in general intelligence estimated from a meta-analysis of
the slowing of simple reaction time. Intelligence.
doi:10.1016/j.intell.2013.04.006http://drjamesthompson.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/original-paper-high-quality-replication.html
***
Saturday, 25 May 2013
Is the claim of one standard deviation decline in intelligence since Victorian times an extraordinary claim, implying the need for extraordinary evidence?
*
The phrase and practice of "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" is one of those superficially-plausible statements which are untrue, and indeed damagingly false.
*
Of course, this does not mean we should believe anything anybody might say no matter how absurd - but in practice the whole thing hinges on the meaning of 'extraordinary'.
In practice:
1. The definition of an extraordinary claim is 'something I don't already believe'...
While
2. The definition of extraordinary evidence is that no amount of evidence will ever be enough to convince me of that.
*
People find all sorts of things extraordinary which are not.
Modern atheist intellectuals, for example, find the idea of God or gods to be extraordinary, and all kinds of other things such as souls, angels and demons, the Virgin Birth and the resurrection of Christ - plus all sorts of things like telepathy and prophetic dreams - despite that these are not extraordinary to the vast majority of people alive, and to almost nobody in the sweep of human history.
Claims of the reality of things may or may not be factually correct - in general, or specifically - but these are not extraordinary claims - and the 'evidence' for them is of exactly the same nature as for anything else.
*
In science, a major area which asks for extraordinary evidence is claims of group differences in hereditary personality and intelligence. Around about 1965, it was rather suddenly decided that the claim of heritable group differences was extraordinary, and extraordinary evidence was demanded - and fifty years of research later exactly the same demand is still being made.
Each piece of evidence in support of the supposedly-extraordinary claim of heritable group differences is put under a microscope to check for flaws - and of course flaws can be found - especially when people don't look use the same microscope to study the beliefs that they believe.
So, those who reject heritable group differences believe what they believe, and which (because they believe it) they do not regard as extraordinary - and accept any further evidence in support of this belief with just a cursory glance; but anything they don't want to believe is checked, inch by inch, under a microscope and - guess what? - is found to have flaws! Therefore they feel justified in rejecting it.
*
This pretends to be 'rigorous' ('Look at me - I'm a real scientist! I'm using a microscope!') but it is of course, that is phony science, politicized science.
Indeed, the practice of accepting supporting evidence at a glance while putting opposing evidence under a microscope is not just bad science - it is not science at all.
*
Yet even outside of politics this technique of differential rigour is an easy trap to fall-into - indeed there are very few who are exempt.
This is something to be guarded against.
*
When I was editor of Medical Hypotheses it was the last major non-peer reviewed journal in science - and its special value was that it had the potential to overcome the intrinsic bias of 'peers' to defend the existing paradigm by demanding 'extraordinary' evidence for any new work which disagreed with the prevailing paradigm.
But what if the evidence for the prevailing paradigm is weak?
In modern professional science there are many dominant but evidentially (and logically) weak research paradigms - but these are defended as tenaciously - or even more tenaciously, than coherent and strongly supported paradigms.
*
For example, in psychiatry there is a decades-established prevailing explanation of 'depression' in terms of neurotransmitter abnormalities and of treatment by 'antidepressants' which correct these presumed abnormalities.
This paradigm does not make any sense and there is no evidence to support it - yet 'everyone' believes it - and any alternative perspectives are (therefore?) treated as requiring 'extraordinary' levels of evidence, such as clear and unambiguous support from multiple multi-million-dollar, mega-randomized controlled trials. Hence the prevailing nonsense is impregnable.
*
Declaration of interest: all this stuff is happening, now, to me and Michael A Woodley et al with respect to the use of longitudinal reaction time data to estimate long term trends in general intelligence.
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/the-e-mail-when-i-had-idea-of-using.html
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/the-decline-in-general-intelligence.html
The problems are that the result contradicts current notions of:
1. Direction
2. Size
3. Rapidity
of change in intelligence. Therefore the result challenges the current paradigm in several respects.
*
To put it another way, Woodley and myself are regarded as making an extraordinary claim - and this is used to justify putting this particular study under an extra-powerful methodological microscope (and if that doesn't suffice - an electron microscope) to search for, and inevitably find, microscopic cracks (gaps) and flaws (distortions) in the evidence.
*
But consider the counter-factuals.
Suppose that the data had shown a reduction in reaction time since the Victorian era (implying increasing intelligence) - which would be consistent with the Flynn effect - what would people have done?
In other words, what if the study - and I mean exactly the same study in terms of exactly the same evidence and methodology - had found exactly what people expected it to find?
Well, of course this would not have been an 'extraordinary' claim, so people would have accepted the study as a matter of course and without further discussion.
*
But suppose (again counter-factually) that the study (exactly the same data set and methodology) had instead found a small increase in reaction time? Implying a small reduction in average intelligence?
Well, that too would have been accepted without much discussion - since it would not signify much either way.
Nobody would have put the study under an electron microscope.
*
But in real life the data showed a big increase in reaction times implying a big reduction of intelligence since Victorian times.
This is indeed a paradigm-shifting claim; and it is 'therefore' regarded as an extraordinary claim - and therefore this is used to justify (as described above) extraordinary examination of the claim - on the basis of the slogan in the title.
But is this an extraordinary claim?
*
If it really was extraordinary to claim that intelligence had declined by about one standard deviation since Victorian times, it would be easy to present many evidences and examples which very obviously refuted that claim.
Yet none have been presented.
Obviously, the best way to reject a claim is to refute it with clear and unambiguous contrary evidence - and if you are reduced to quibbling over methodology, then the claim is revealed as being not extraordinary - and therefore not requiring extraordinary levels of micro-critique.
*
So, although people feel that the claim of a rapid and significant decline in intelligence is so extraordinary as to invite extreme skepticism; in practice - or so it seems - it is not easy to refute this claim without stepping outside of real science and becoming the kind of phony, fake, pseudo-scientist who polices the field of heritable IQ group differences.
And this is what we find.
*
Under pretence of rigour, there is not just bad science, but non-science - anti-science.
*
So, if micro-analysis of potentially paradigm changing claims is revealed as anti-science, then what should be done?
Well, paradigm-changing claims should be evaluated in the same way and to the same standards of research competence and honesty as paradigm-supporting claims.
When a piece of research reaches the normal standards of competence and honesty, yet has extraordinary implications, then it is distorting and inappropriate and in fact anti-science to dwell upon the micro-details of this research.
*
The correct thing to do is to recognize that in real science multiple evidences converge upon the truth.
That is exactly why science is important - because true scientific claims have multiple consequences - or, to put it another way, the implications of important true theories ramify through reality, and therefore their consequences can be observed in many places.
So when the claim of reduced intelligence is based upon longitudinal change in reaction times, then the matter is not to be settled 'methodologically' by ever more, ever more voluminous and complex and precise measurements of reaction times - but instead by seeking convergent evidence from different fields - by tracing out the implications of the claim through reality until these implications go into places where they can be observed and checked.
Therefore, what is needed is to discover what would-be the implications of a significant and rapid decline in average intelligence, and then make observations to see whether these implications really have happened.
*
If the claim of an approximately one standard deviation decline in intelligence since Victorian times really is false; then, because this is a very significant claim, it should be easy to discover some strong evidence which contradicts the claim.
But such a claim need not, and certainly should not be required to, meet 'extraordinary' standards of evidence!
*
In conclusion:
If a claim is both 'extraordinary' and also wrong, it must be trivially easy to refute.
But if a claim which seems 'extraordinary' cannot in practice easily be refuted; then it is not really an extraordinary claim, and should not be treated as such.
*
The phrase and practice of "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" is one of those superficially-plausible statements which are untrue, and indeed damagingly false.
*
Of course, this does not mean we should believe anything anybody might say no matter how absurd - but in practice the whole thing hinges on the meaning of 'extraordinary'.
In practice:
1. The definition of an extraordinary claim is 'something I don't already believe'...
While
2. The definition of extraordinary evidence is that no amount of evidence will ever be enough to convince me of that.
*
People find all sorts of things extraordinary which are not.
Modern atheist intellectuals, for example, find the idea of God or gods to be extraordinary, and all kinds of other things such as souls, angels and demons, the Virgin Birth and the resurrection of Christ - plus all sorts of things like telepathy and prophetic dreams - despite that these are not extraordinary to the vast majority of people alive, and to almost nobody in the sweep of human history.
Claims of the reality of things may or may not be factually correct - in general, or specifically - but these are not extraordinary claims - and the 'evidence' for them is of exactly the same nature as for anything else.
*
In science, a major area which asks for extraordinary evidence is claims of group differences in hereditary personality and intelligence. Around about 1965, it was rather suddenly decided that the claim of heritable group differences was extraordinary, and extraordinary evidence was demanded - and fifty years of research later exactly the same demand is still being made.
Each piece of evidence in support of the supposedly-extraordinary claim of heritable group differences is put under a microscope to check for flaws - and of course flaws can be found - especially when people don't look use the same microscope to study the beliefs that they believe.
So, those who reject heritable group differences believe what they believe, and which (because they believe it) they do not regard as extraordinary - and accept any further evidence in support of this belief with just a cursory glance; but anything they don't want to believe is checked, inch by inch, under a microscope and - guess what? - is found to have flaws! Therefore they feel justified in rejecting it.
*
This pretends to be 'rigorous' ('Look at me - I'm a real scientist! I'm using a microscope!') but it is of course, that is phony science, politicized science.
Indeed, the practice of accepting supporting evidence at a glance while putting opposing evidence under a microscope is not just bad science - it is not science at all.
*
Yet even outside of politics this technique of differential rigour is an easy trap to fall-into - indeed there are very few who are exempt.
This is something to be guarded against.
*
When I was editor of Medical Hypotheses it was the last major non-peer reviewed journal in science - and its special value was that it had the potential to overcome the intrinsic bias of 'peers' to defend the existing paradigm by demanding 'extraordinary' evidence for any new work which disagreed with the prevailing paradigm.
But what if the evidence for the prevailing paradigm is weak?
In modern professional science there are many dominant but evidentially (and logically) weak research paradigms - but these are defended as tenaciously - or even more tenaciously, than coherent and strongly supported paradigms.
*
For example, in psychiatry there is a decades-established prevailing explanation of 'depression' in terms of neurotransmitter abnormalities and of treatment by 'antidepressants' which correct these presumed abnormalities.
This paradigm does not make any sense and there is no evidence to support it - yet 'everyone' believes it - and any alternative perspectives are (therefore?) treated as requiring 'extraordinary' levels of evidence, such as clear and unambiguous support from multiple multi-million-dollar, mega-randomized controlled trials. Hence the prevailing nonsense is impregnable.
*
Declaration of interest: all this stuff is happening, now, to me and Michael A Woodley et al with respect to the use of longitudinal reaction time data to estimate long term trends in general intelligence.
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/the-e-mail-when-i-had-idea-of-using.html
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/the-decline-in-general-intelligence.html
The problems are that the result contradicts current notions of:
1. Direction
2. Size
3. Rapidity
of change in intelligence. Therefore the result challenges the current paradigm in several respects.
*
To put it another way, Woodley and myself are regarded as making an extraordinary claim - and this is used to justify putting this particular study under an extra-powerful methodological microscope (and if that doesn't suffice - an electron microscope) to search for, and inevitably find, microscopic cracks (gaps) and flaws (distortions) in the evidence.
*
But consider the counter-factuals.
Suppose that the data had shown a reduction in reaction time since the Victorian era (implying increasing intelligence) - which would be consistent with the Flynn effect - what would people have done?
In other words, what if the study - and I mean exactly the same study in terms of exactly the same evidence and methodology - had found exactly what people expected it to find?
Well, of course this would not have been an 'extraordinary' claim, so people would have accepted the study as a matter of course and without further discussion.
*
But suppose (again counter-factually) that the study (exactly the same data set and methodology) had instead found a small increase in reaction time? Implying a small reduction in average intelligence?
Well, that too would have been accepted without much discussion - since it would not signify much either way.
Nobody would have put the study under an electron microscope.
*
But in real life the data showed a big increase in reaction times implying a big reduction of intelligence since Victorian times.
This is indeed a paradigm-shifting claim; and it is 'therefore' regarded as an extraordinary claim - and therefore this is used to justify (as described above) extraordinary examination of the claim - on the basis of the slogan in the title.
But is this an extraordinary claim?
*
If it really was extraordinary to claim that intelligence had declined by about one standard deviation since Victorian times, it would be easy to present many evidences and examples which very obviously refuted that claim.
Yet none have been presented.
Obviously, the best way to reject a claim is to refute it with clear and unambiguous contrary evidence - and if you are reduced to quibbling over methodology, then the claim is revealed as being not extraordinary - and therefore not requiring extraordinary levels of micro-critique.
*
So, although people feel that the claim of a rapid and significant decline in intelligence is so extraordinary as to invite extreme skepticism; in practice - or so it seems - it is not easy to refute this claim without stepping outside of real science and becoming the kind of phony, fake, pseudo-scientist who polices the field of heritable IQ group differences.
And this is what we find.
*
Under pretence of rigour, there is not just bad science, but non-science - anti-science.
*
So, if micro-analysis of potentially paradigm changing claims is revealed as anti-science, then what should be done?
Well, paradigm-changing claims should be evaluated in the same way and to the same standards of research competence and honesty as paradigm-supporting claims.
When a piece of research reaches the normal standards of competence and honesty, yet has extraordinary implications, then it is distorting and inappropriate and in fact anti-science to dwell upon the micro-details of this research.
*
The correct thing to do is to recognize that in real science multiple evidences converge upon the truth.
That is exactly why science is important - because true scientific claims have multiple consequences - or, to put it another way, the implications of important true theories ramify through reality, and therefore their consequences can be observed in many places.
So when the claim of reduced intelligence is based upon longitudinal change in reaction times, then the matter is not to be settled 'methodologically' by ever more, ever more voluminous and complex and precise measurements of reaction times - but instead by seeking convergent evidence from different fields - by tracing out the implications of the claim through reality until these implications go into places where they can be observed and checked.
Therefore, what is needed is to discover what would-be the implications of a significant and rapid decline in average intelligence, and then make observations to see whether these implications really have happened.
*
If the claim of an approximately one standard deviation decline in intelligence since Victorian times really is false; then, because this is a very significant claim, it should be easy to discover some strong evidence which contradicts the claim.
But such a claim need not, and certainly should not be required to, meet 'extraordinary' standards of evidence!
*
In conclusion:
If a claim is both 'extraordinary' and also wrong, it must be trivially easy to refute.
But if a claim which seems 'extraordinary' cannot in practice easily be refuted; then it is not really an extraordinary claim, and should not be treated as such.
*
Wednesday, 15 May 2013
More than one third decline in general intelligence since Victorian times?
*
Having reflected on the title of an earlier post which described the decline in intelligence since Victorian times in terms of approximately 15 IQ points (or one standard deviation):
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/the-15-point-decline-in-g-since.html
And then thinking about the idea of using reaction times as a scale of general intelligence:
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/the-ordinal-scale-of-iq-could-be.html
I realized that it would make more sense to most people if the decline in intelligence was expressed in terms of percentages.
*
Of course this is only approximate, but if the data from Silverman's paper is used the (median) average Victorian men's reaction time was 183ms (milliseconds), while the (mean) average Modern men's reaction time was 250 ms.
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/taking-on-board-that-victorians-were.html
So the slowing from Victorian to Modern reaction times is 67ms
which is approx 37 percent of the Victorian reaction time of 183 ms; and 37 percent is more than one third.
*
So, in a phrase and using Victorian intelligence as the baseline; it would be reasonable to say that average intelligence had declined by more than one third since Victorian times.
*
And what does this 'one third' refer to?
MA Woodley talks of reaction times as a measure of core efficiency of the central nervous system - and this slowing of reaction times therefore suggests that our average thinking is biologically less efficient than the Victorians such that Victorian brains could perform an extra thirty seven percent more intelligent processing per unit time.
*
Having reflected on the title of an earlier post which described the decline in intelligence since Victorian times in terms of approximately 15 IQ points (or one standard deviation):
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/the-15-point-decline-in-g-since.html
And then thinking about the idea of using reaction times as a scale of general intelligence:
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/the-ordinal-scale-of-iq-could-be.html
I realized that it would make more sense to most people if the decline in intelligence was expressed in terms of percentages.
*
Of course this is only approximate, but if the data from Silverman's paper is used the (median) average Victorian men's reaction time was 183ms (milliseconds), while the (mean) average Modern men's reaction time was 250 ms.
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/taking-on-board-that-victorians-were.html
So the slowing from Victorian to Modern reaction times is 67ms
which is approx 37 percent of the Victorian reaction time of 183 ms; and 37 percent is more than one third.
*
So, in a phrase and using Victorian intelligence as the baseline; it would be reasonable to say that average intelligence had declined by more than one third since Victorian times.
*
And what does this 'one third' refer to?
MA Woodley talks of reaction times as a measure of core efficiency of the central nervous system - and this slowing of reaction times therefore suggests that our average thinking is biologically less efficient than the Victorians such that Victorian brains could perform an extra thirty seven percent more intelligent processing per unit time.
*
Sunday, 12 May 2013
The e-mails from 2008 when I had the idea of using historical reaction time data to measure trends in intelligence
*
Two e-mails to Richard Lynn (Emeritus Professor, University of Ulster)
5th July 2008 14:43
Richard,
I've just this morening got Dysgenesis from the ILL service - I've so far just looked through the contents and headings.
I think I have an idea for measuring dysgenic change which doesn't seem to be in the book - by using reaction times.
Since reaction time correlates with IQ, and since I believe it is an old physological measurement, it is possible that there are representative data on national population reaction times over the past 100 or so years.
Since high IQ people have a fertility considerably below replacement level, my prediction would be that average reaction time would have become longer, and that the standard deviation would have become smaller (due to selective loss of shorter reaction times).
Do you think this makes sense as an hypothesis?
Maybe somebody has already done it, or if not - do you know of any databases of reaction times (or somebody whom I might contact about this?)
Best wishes, Yours, Bruce
I've just this morening got Dysgenesis from the ILL service - I've so far just looked through the contents and headings.
I think I have an idea for measuring dysgenic change which doesn't seem to be in the book - by using reaction times.
Since reaction time correlates with IQ, and since I believe it is an old physological measurement, it is possible that there are representative data on national population reaction times over the past 100 or so years.
Since high IQ people have a fertility considerably below replacement level, my prediction would be that average reaction time would have become longer, and that the standard deviation would have become smaller (due to selective loss of shorter reaction times).
Do you think this makes sense as an hypothesis?
Maybe somebody has already done it, or if not - do you know of any databases of reaction times (or somebody whom I might contact about this?)
Best wishes, Yours, Bruce
**
9th July 2008 09:28h
Dear Richard,
Thanks for this. Yes - I was assuming/ hoping that RT might be a way to look at genotypic IQ, but as you say this is not known.
I haven't been able to find any old population measures of RT so far (I have only spent a couple of hours on the job, admittedly) - but I think that _if_ reaction times had lengthened throughout the twentieth century, then that would be an interesting observation. On the other hand, average RTs had stayed the same (like inspection times in the paper you mentioned) or if they had shortened throughout the 20th century, then neither of _those_ results would be interesting.
***
Two e-mails to Ian Deary (Professor, University of Edinburgh):
9th July 2008 09:28h
Dear Richard,
Thanks for this. Yes - I was assuming/ hoping that RT might be a way to look at genotypic IQ, but as you say this is not known.
I haven't been able to find any old population measures of RT so far (I have only spent a couple of hours on the job, admittedly) - but I think that _if_ reaction times had lengthened throughout the twentieth century, then that would be an interesting observation. On the other hand, average RTs had stayed the same (like inspection times in the paper you mentioned) or if they had shortened throughout the 20th century, then neither of _those_ results would be interesting.
***
Two e-mails to Ian Deary (Professor, University of Edinburgh):
Monday 7th July 2008 09:51h
Dear Ian,
I'm sorry to badger you when you are still catching up but I have had an idea for measuring dysgenic change by using reaction times which I am keen to follow-up.
Since reaction time correlates with IQ, and since reaction time is an old physiological measurement, it is possible that there are representative data on national population reaction times over the past 100 or so years.
Because high IQ people have a fertility considerably below replacement level, my prediction would be that average reaction time in developed countries should have become longer, and that the standard deviation would have become smaller (due to selective loss of shorter reaction times).
But probably somebody has already done it (perhaps your group?)?
Or maybe reaction time correlates with 'phenotypic' (or measured) IQ (and therefore gets enhanced by the Flynn effect) rather than correlating with underlying 'genotypic' IQ? - I don't know.
If it hasn't already been done - do you know of any databases of reaction times (or somebody whom I might contact about this?
Best wishes, Yours, Bruce
**
7th July 2008 20:11h
Dear Ian
That is *extremely* helpful of you (as ever).
So you have a modern average simple reaction time of 358 ms from Deary et al 2001. And the inspection time paper suggests that RT may be 'genotypic' intelligence - and not comtaiminated by the Flynn effect.
One would imagine it should be simple, in principle, to compare this with older estimates of RT - but so far I have failed to find any - either due to the papers not quoting any actual numbers, or different measure, or not being able to access the paper.
Hmm - I shall keep digging.
With best wishes, Yours, Bruce
***
NOTE: It was not until 28 February 2012 when - as a result of an e-mail interchange we had earlier that day - Michael A Woodley found that data which answered this question: Silverman IW. Simple reaction time: it is not what it used to be. American Journal of Psychology. 2010; 123: 39-50. As can be seen, Silverman's review and analysis had not been published in July 2008, when I made my failed attempt to discover some relevant evidence.
http://charltonteaching.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/convincing-objective-and-direct.html
*
Dear Ian,
I'm sorry to badger you when you are still catching up but I have had an idea for measuring dysgenic change by using reaction times which I am keen to follow-up.
Since reaction time correlates with IQ, and since reaction time is an old physiological measurement, it is possible that there are representative data on national population reaction times over the past 100 or so years.
Because high IQ people have a fertility considerably below replacement level, my prediction would be that average reaction time in developed countries should have become longer, and that the standard deviation would have become smaller (due to selective loss of shorter reaction times).
But probably somebody has already done it (perhaps your group?)?
Or maybe reaction time correlates with 'phenotypic' (or measured) IQ (and therefore gets enhanced by the Flynn effect) rather than correlating with underlying 'genotypic' IQ? - I don't know.
If it hasn't already been done - do you know of any databases of reaction times (or somebody whom I might contact about this?
Best wishes, Yours, Bruce
**
7th July 2008 20:11h
Dear Ian
That is *extremely* helpful of you (as ever).
So you have a modern average simple reaction time of 358 ms from Deary et al 2001. And the inspection time paper suggests that RT may be 'genotypic' intelligence - and not comtaiminated by the Flynn effect.
One would imagine it should be simple, in principle, to compare this with older estimates of RT - but so far I have failed to find any - either due to the papers not quoting any actual numbers, or different measure, or not being able to access the paper.
Hmm - I shall keep digging.
With best wishes, Yours, Bruce
***
NOTE: It was not until 28 February 2012 when - as a result of an e-mail interchange we had earlier that day - Michael A Woodley found that data which answered this question: Silverman IW. Simple reaction time: it is not what it used to be. American Journal of Psychology. 2010; 123: 39-50. As can be seen, Silverman's review and analysis had not been published in July 2008, when I made my failed attempt to discover some relevant evidence.
http://charltonteaching.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/convincing-objective-and-direct.html
*
Friday, 10 May 2013
The 15 point decline in IQ since Victorian times - what next?
*
Okay - so simple reaction time data indicates that average general intelligence has declined by about one standard deviation (15 IQ points) since the late 1800s.
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/taking-on-board-that-victorians-were.html
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/the-over-promoted-society-bishops-and.html
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/what-are-genetic-causes-of-dysgenic.html
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/the-decline-in-general-intelligence.html
What next?
Should we believe it?
*
Well, here are a few considerations:
1. Simple reaction times are the most objective evidence we have concerning trends in general intelligence.
Therefore we should:
a. believe them, or
b. come-up with something better, or
c. show how these studies of reaction times are incompetent, or
d. assume that the studies of reaction times are dishonest, or
e. assume that this data is wrong on the basis that most data is wrong (and because we are under no obligation to believe any particular bit of data - quite the contrary, there must be good reasons for believing any specific proposition)
*
2. Any other data which can be brought to bear on the matter of declining intelligence is (I think) relatively 'soft', subjective and imprecise compared with reaction times - (things like rates of major innovation, rates of geniuses etc) so - although I see much of what seems to be consistent with a significant and relatively rapid decline in general intelligence - it is unlikely to convince someone who does not want to believe in the first place.
On the other hand, even if it does not support, does any of this long terms evidence of general intelligence contradict the thesis that it has declined?
I mean, is there any decent evidence that general intelligence has actually risen? (aside from the Flynn effect of increasing pen and paper IQ test scores - which is not relevant here since it is what is being explained, and therefore inadmissible as evidence).
Has, for instance, per capita performance improved since the late 1800s in any 'g' related and quantifiable human endeavour? I know this is tricky to answer, since there are shifts in the specialized activities of intellectuals (e.g. away from study of The Classics and towards some of the sciences, or medicine) - but is there is reasonably compelling evidence of this sort of improvement?
*
3. If is is decided that we should, after all, accept the best evidence as showing a significant decline in average intelligence since the late 1800s, then there is quite a lot of further work to be done on the mechanism - because, on the whole, present understanding of 'dysgenic' mechanisms in relation to intelligence is not adequate to explain the rapidity of this decline.
(I mean, that calculations based on differential reproduction and heredity of intelligence predict a much slower rate of decline than could lead to one SD reduction in 'g' in the space of just four or five generations.)
The accumulation of deleterious mutations with the relaxation of selection due to high rates of child mortality is my first best guess at the likely 'extra' mechanism (and Michael Woodley agrees)
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/what-are-genetic-causes-of-dysgenic.html
but really this is just a best guess, and the detailed mechanisms of how this might work are unclear.
However, it could make interesting science in trying to find-out!
*
Okay - so simple reaction time data indicates that average general intelligence has declined by about one standard deviation (15 IQ points) since the late 1800s.
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/taking-on-board-that-victorians-were.html
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/the-over-promoted-society-bishops-and.html
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/what-are-genetic-causes-of-dysgenic.html
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/the-decline-in-general-intelligence.html
What next?
Should we believe it?
*
Well, here are a few considerations:
1. Simple reaction times are the most objective evidence we have concerning trends in general intelligence.
Therefore we should:
a. believe them, or
b. come-up with something better, or
c. show how these studies of reaction times are incompetent, or
d. assume that the studies of reaction times are dishonest, or
e. assume that this data is wrong on the basis that most data is wrong (and because we are under no obligation to believe any particular bit of data - quite the contrary, there must be good reasons for believing any specific proposition)
*
2. Any other data which can be brought to bear on the matter of declining intelligence is (I think) relatively 'soft', subjective and imprecise compared with reaction times - (things like rates of major innovation, rates of geniuses etc) so - although I see much of what seems to be consistent with a significant and relatively rapid decline in general intelligence - it is unlikely to convince someone who does not want to believe in the first place.
On the other hand, even if it does not support, does any of this long terms evidence of general intelligence contradict the thesis that it has declined?
I mean, is there any decent evidence that general intelligence has actually risen? (aside from the Flynn effect of increasing pen and paper IQ test scores - which is not relevant here since it is what is being explained, and therefore inadmissible as evidence).
Has, for instance, per capita performance improved since the late 1800s in any 'g' related and quantifiable human endeavour? I know this is tricky to answer, since there are shifts in the specialized activities of intellectuals (e.g. away from study of The Classics and towards some of the sciences, or medicine) - but is there is reasonably compelling evidence of this sort of improvement?
*
3. If is is decided that we should, after all, accept the best evidence as showing a significant decline in average intelligence since the late 1800s, then there is quite a lot of further work to be done on the mechanism - because, on the whole, present understanding of 'dysgenic' mechanisms in relation to intelligence is not adequate to explain the rapidity of this decline.
(I mean, that calculations based on differential reproduction and heredity of intelligence predict a much slower rate of decline than could lead to one SD reduction in 'g' in the space of just four or five generations.)
The accumulation of deleterious mutations with the relaxation of selection due to high rates of child mortality is my first best guess at the likely 'extra' mechanism (and Michael Woodley agrees)
http://iqpersonalitygenius.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/what-are-genetic-causes-of-dysgenic.html
but really this is just a best guess, and the detailed mechanisms of how this might work are unclear.
However, it could make interesting science in trying to find-out!
*
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